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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Ms. Rita Hoagland 
individually, as an heir and as personal representative for denial of her deceased son's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to medical care and safety while he was a detainee at the Ada County Jail 
where his life was taken by suicide. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On January 23, 2009, Ms. Hoagland filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court, 
Ada County, against Ada County and certain employees of the Ada County Jail (the "Jail"), 
seeking monetary damages, Ms. Hoagland filed an amended complaint on July 12,2010, which 
dismissed all the original Defendants except for Ada County and the Sheriff, while adding the 
Defendants that now appear in the caption (collectively the "Ada County Defendants"). On 
September 14, 2010, Ms. Hoagland filed her Third Amended Complaint. 
On September 20, 2010, the Ada County Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds of 
standing. On November 2, 2010, the trial court granted in part and denied in part the 
Defendants' motion by dismissing Count I of Ms. Hoagland's Complaint. Ms. Hoagland brought 
Count I in her capacity as heir and personal representative of her son's estate. 
On November 12, 2010, the Ada County Defendants answered the Third Amended 
Complaint and at the same time moved for summary judgment. On November 23, 2010, 
Ms. Hoagland moved for reconsideration of the trial court's November 2, 2010 order of 
dismissal. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 1 
On January 20, 2011, the trial court granted in part the Ada County Defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, which dismissed all of the Ada County Defendants except James 
Johnson ("Johnson"). The trial court also denied Ms. Hoagland's motion for reconsideration of 
its November 2,2011 ruling dismissing Count I of her Complaint. 
On February 3,2011, Johnson moved for reconsideration of the trial court's January 20, 
2011 order, seeking judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. On February 7, 2011, 
Ms. Hoagland moved for reconsideration of the trial court's January 20, 2011 order and thereby 
sought reinstatement of her claims against some of the Ada County Defendants. 
On March 28, 2011, the trial court granted Johnson summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity, and denied Ms. Hoagland's motion for reconsideration. The Ada County 
Defendants thereafter filed a memorandum of costs, and Ms. Hoagland moved to disallow costs. 
After hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Hoagland' s motion to disallow costs and awarded the 
Ada County Defendants $93,253.43 in costs. 
On May 4, 2011, Ms. Hoagland filed her Notice of Appeal. Final Judgment was entered 
on May 25, 2011. A Judgment for Costs was entered on October 24, 2011, and Ms. Hoagland 
filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 28,2011. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On September 29, 2008, Bradley Munroe ("Bradley") took his life while he was a 
detainee at the Ada County Jail ("Jail"). I The night before, Bradley had been arrested for 
I R. pp. 290-91 (Overson Aff., ~, 26-29,33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-03 (Overson Aff., ~~ 15-19), 
2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119». 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2 
robbing a convenience store.2 The arresting officers found Bradley's behavior so bizarre that 
they took him to the hospital for evaluation.3 After the hospital, Bradley was taken to the Jail, 
where he continued acting strangely.4 The officers at the Jail were not able to book him into the 
Jail because of his behavior, and ultimately they put him on suicide watch in an observation cell. 5 
Jail records indicate that Bradley threatened his own life and his clothes were taken away after he 
tried to strangle himself with them.6 Bradley remained on suicide watch until the following 
morning when Johnson, who was one of the Jail's psychiatric social workers, removed Bradley 
from suicide watch status.7 
1. Wroblewski's contact with Bradley. 
Jeremy Wroblewski ("Wroblewski") was a deputy for the Ada County Jail.8 His first 
involvement with Bradley was at 7:02 a.m. on September 28,2008. 9 He reviewed a security log 
kept by the Jail that relayed some of Bradley's behaviors from the night before, including his 
attempt to tie string around his neck. 10 Bradley was removed from his observation cell at about 
2 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 207-22) (Defs" 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119». 
3 Id. 
4 R. pp. 159-65. 
5 R. pp. 159-65, 290-91 (Overson Aff., " 26-29, 33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-3 (Overson Aff., 
~, 15-19), 2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-74) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119». 
R. pp. 290-91 (Overson Aff.", 26-29,33-34, Exs. 13-17),1402-3 (Overson Aff., ,,15-19), 
2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 223-74) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-119». 
7 Id. 
8 R. pp. 2073-77 (Overson Aff." 8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 575) (Wroblewski Dep., 6:18-7:4). 
9 R. pp.135-140, 2073-77 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp.584-86, 621-22, 650-51) 
(Wroblewski Dep., 45: 17 -51 :4, Ex. F». 
10 !d. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 3 
7:52 a.m., and at about 8:00 a.m., Wroblewski started fingerprinting Bradley.ll At 8:01 a.m., 
social worker Johnson arrived and talked to Bradley until 8:04 a.m. and then left the area. 12 
While Johnson and Bradley spoke, Wroblewski continued to fingerprint Bradley.13 Wroblewski 
finished fingerprinting Bradley at 8:05 a.m. 14 From 8:06 a.m. to 8:34 a.m., Bradley placed four 
calls from the Jail. ls However, Wroblewski estimated the time at 8:26 a.m. when he moved 
Bradley to a different office where Wroblewski and Bradley completed Bradley's intake health 
• . 16 questIOnnaire. 
According to Wroblewski, he and Bradley completed the health questionnaire at 
8:33 a.m. l7 During the questioning, Wroblewski noted that Bradley's appearance was "poor" 
and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and appeared to be under the influence of aicohol. I8 
Bradley said he had been on an antidepressant. 19 During the questioning, Bradley told 
Wroblewski he was seeing visions C'Shadow People") and hearing voices telling him to run; that 
II R. pp. 135-140,1437-40 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (video CD)), 2073-77 (Overson Aff., ~ 
Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577-86,590-91,598-610,621-23,650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3, 19:10-
19,20:22-29:15,31:12-32:1,33:18-35:24, 37:10-51:4, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-G)), 2627-28 (Overson 
Aff, ~ 13, Ex. 11 (video CD)). 
12 Id.; see also R. pp. 183-87. 
13 !d. 
14 Id. 
IS R. pp.729-30, 1398-1407, 2074 (Overson Aff., 11 6, Ex. E (.pdf pp. 389-90) (Investigative 
Report, pp. 8-9)). 
16 R. p. 2075 (Overson AfT., 11 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 583, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski Dep., 
40:9-14,67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E & G)). 
17 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., 11 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 584, 598-99, 602-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 44:23-
45:16, Exs. B, D, & E)). 
18 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., 1I 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 51 :7-52:25, 
Ex. E)). 
19 !d. 
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he had recently been in a psychiatric care hospital; that he had contemplated suicide; and that he 
had attempted suicide in the past.20 When Wroblewski asked, "Are you now contemplating 
suicideT Bradley said, '·Yes.,,21 
Wroblewski answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk 
of suicideT22 
When Wroblewski interviewed Bradley, Wroblewski understood Jail policy required him 
to inform the medical unit if an inmate answered '-Yes" to any of the suicide questions on the 
questionnaire.23 Wroblewski told no one of the five "Yes" answers to the suicide questions.24 
2. James Johnson's contact with Bradley. 
Bradley was put on suicide watch because his behavior on the evening of September 28, 
2008, demonstrated that he was a threat to himself.25 The next morning, a detention officer 
called the Jail medical unit and asked that Bradley be assessed for suicide risk. 26 Johnson was 
assigned the task, but before talking with Bradley, he reviewed Bradley's medical records at the 
20 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff." 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 586-89,591,606-10,624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 
53:18-20,59:1-63:17,65:1-6,70:19-73:8, Exs. E, H-K)). 
21 !d. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.; see R. pp. 2896-2900 for testimony of how the policies worked in practice. 
24 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586-89, 591, 606-10, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 
53:18-20,59:1-63:17,65:1-6,70:19-73:8, Exs. E, H-K)). 
25 R. pp. 159-65, 2074 (Overson Aff., , 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 207-22, 256-57, 265-69) (Defs' 2d 
Supp. Resp. 1-16,92-93,110-14),,8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., Ex. L)), 2627-
28 (Overson Aff., Ex. 13 (Ex. QQQ) (video CD)), 2877-2884 (Brewer Dep., 5:2-36:25). 
76 ~ R. pp. 135-40, 141-44, 159-65, 2074 (Overson Aff." 5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 207-22, 256-57, 265-
69, 279) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 1-16, 92-93, 110-14, 124), , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 650-51) 
(Wroblewski Dep., Ex. L)). 
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Jail.27 The September 28, 2008 incarceration was Bradley's fourth incarceration at the Jai1.28 
The Jail's records documented his history of suicidal ideations, suicide attempts, psychiatric 
hospitalizations, mental illness, and antidepressant and antipsychotic medications to control his 
mental illness.29 The records included Johnson's own September 1, 2008 assessment of 
Bradley's suicide risk during one of Bradley's previous incarcerations.3o In that assessment, 
Johnson noted that Bradley had been in a psychiatric hospital two weeks earlier for attempted 
suicide; had a history of treatment for mental disorders; believed his symptoms were well-
controlled by his medications; and was not having suicidal ideations at that time.3l 
When Johnson spoke with Bradley on the morning of September 29, 2008, he spent less 
than five minutes with Bradley before clearing him from suicide watch.32 Johnson took 
Bradley's statement that he was no longer suicidal at face value, even though Bradley presented 
with many of the factors that are considered as putting an inmate at high risk of suicide.33 After 
27 R. pp. 135-40, 141-44, 151-54, 293 (Overson Aff., , 62, Ex. 23), 1405 (Overson Aff., 112), 
2074 (Overson Aff., , 2, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 25-51) (Robertson Dep., Exs. C-D), '9, Ex. G (.pdf 
p. 670) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)), 2663, 2667, 2674 (Johnson Dep., 126:19-25, 142:3-143:18, 
172:12-16). 
28 R. pp. 148-50. 
29 R. pp. 135-40, 290-91, 293 (Overson Aff., " 25-29, 33-34, 62, Exs. 13-17, 23), 1402-3 
(Overson Aff.", 15-19), 2074 {Overson Aff." 2, Ex A (.pdfpp. 8, 14,25-51) (Robertson Dep., 
24:1-16, 46:3-47:19, Ex. C), , 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 228-29,234-35, 240-41, 254-55, 275-308) 
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp.), '6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 393-94) (Investigative Report, pp. 12-l3),' 9, Ex. G 
(.pdfp. 670) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)), 2662 (Johnson Dep., 121:24-122:2). 
30 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ,5, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 293) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 138)). 
31 Id. 
32 R. p. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074 (Overson Aff., , 5, Ex. D (.pdf p. 271) 
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 116). 
33 R. pp. 137-39, 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2657-59, 2663-95 (Johnson Dep., 
101:8-15,105:16-109:2,121:24-122:2,126:19-254:6). 
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Johnson left the area and Wroblewski completed the medical screening questionnaire, Bradley 
was escorted to another area of the Jail for general housing. 34 Bradley told the officer escorting 
him that he needed protective custody because "Everyone wants to kill me.,·35 However, Bradley 
could not identify anyone that wanted to harm him.36 The deputy told a classifications officer, 
who in tum told Johnson, what Bradley had said.37 Johnson told classifications that Bradley was 
"agitated" but not suicidal, and then approved him for protective custody cell assignment-
which is a single person cell assignment. 38 Bradley was placed by the officers in a protective 
custody cell, alone, with a bunk-bed and a sheet.39 The cell was at the end of a short hall where 
officers and other prisoners could not see Bradley unless they looked through a small window.40 
Around 10:00 a.m., Ms. Hoagland called the Jail's administrative supervisor, Leslie 
Robertson, and said that she was concerned about Bradley's safety.41 As Robertson understood 
34 R. pp. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdf p. 271) 
(Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 116),2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 
25). 
3 - th ) R. pp. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5 Supp. Resp. 25», 2628 (Overson 
Aff., ~ 13, Ex. 13 (video CD». 
36 Id. 
37 R. pp. 131-34, 166-69,2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), 
~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfp. 673) (Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 25». 
38 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdf 
f<P. 381-95) (Investigative Report, p. 3). 
9 R. pp. 131-34, 166-69,2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), 
~ 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 381-95) (Investigative Report, pp. 3, 10, 12-13). 
40 R. p. 2628 (Overson Aff., Ex. 15 (Ex. PP». 
41 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (Robertson Dep., pp. 17-41, Exs. B, C and D), ~ 6, Ex. E 
(.pdfp. 393) (Investigative Report, p. 12). 
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it, Bradley had called that morning from the Jail, threatening suicide.42 Ms. Hoagland told 
Robertson about Bradley's last three serious suicide attempts: cutting his wrist, overdosing, and 
jumping from a bridge.43 She said that Bradley had been hospitalized repeatedly for suicide 
attempts, including a recent hospitalization at Intermountain.44 After Robertson hung up with 
Ms. Hoagland, Robertson relayed to Johnson all the information as she understood it from 
Ms. Hoagland.45 Johnson took no action in response to the new information.46 
Dr. Thomas White, a nationally recognized expert on the subject of in-custody suicide 
screening, identified Johnson's conduct as amounting to deliberate indifference to Bradley's 
serious medical and mental health, and security needs.47 Specifically, Dr. White indicated that 
Johnson's conduct was an extreme deviation from the accepted jail standards for conducting 
inmate suicide assessments. 48 Dr. Jeffrey Metzner, also a nationally recognized expert on the 
subject of in-custody suicide assessments and jail operations involving healthcare, testified by 
affidavit that Johnson's assessment was "clearly below the standard of correctional mental health 
care. ,.49 Licensed Clinical Social Worker Nathan Powell also provided his expert opinion that 
42 R. p.2074 (Overson Aff., ,- 6, Ex. E (.pdf pp.393-94) (Defs' Resp. to Pltfs 151 RFP) 
(Investigative Report, pp. 8-9). 
43 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff., ,- 5, Ex. D (.pdfp. 257) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 93), ,- 6, Ex. E (.pdf 
pp. 381-95) (Investigative Report, pp. 3, 10, 12-13). 
44Id. 
45 R. p.2074 (Overson Aff., '-2, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 6-14, 21-79) (Robertson Dep., 17:1-47:20, 
Exs. B, C and D)). 
46 R. pp. 2632-2701. 
47 R. pp. 2120-2197,3012-30. 
48 R. pp. 2132-34. 
49 R. pp. 2091-2119 (specifically 2102). 
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Johnson's conduct was an extreme deviation from accepted social work standards. 50 
The record in this case is full of information that was presented to Johnson that indicated 
that Bradley was at a serious risk of committing suicide. 51 Johnson admitted that he understood 
the seriousness of the suicide risk that Bradley faced. In reference to having written in the record 
on September 29, 2008, that Bradley had recently been hospitalized for suicidal intent, Johnson 
testified as follows: 
50 
Q. On the 29th, when you were done speaking with Bradley, was 
it your understanding that he'd been hospitalized at Intermountain 
for making statements that he was going to commit suicide or an 
actual attempt? 
THE WITNESS: You know, I don't know for sure what my 
thinking was at the time, because -- I know that I had documented 
ideation and an intent, but, you know, I don't know that I was 
thinking suicide attempt. 
I certainly knew that he had made them in the past. But, you 
know, I don't know that I was thinking, on that date, this was the 
attempt that he made. But I know that he's made more than one 
attempt in the past, by report of himself and other people. 
And intent, actually, tends to carry a lot. When I use the word 
"intent," you actually know that I have a high level of concern 
about that. Because ideation is a frequent occurrence for many, 
many people who never corne to the attention of mental health and 
who do come to you. 
Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious 
R. pp. 2080-90. 
51 R. pp. 135-40, 290-91 (Overson Aff., ,~ 26-29, 33-34, Exs. 13-17), 1402-3 (Overson Aff., ~ 
15-19), 2626, 2631-2702 (Johnson Dep., 112:18-114:9, 134:4-139:21, 142:3-242:17, 244:17-
254:6),2074-75 (Overson Aff., ~ 2 Ex. A (.pdf pp. 7-10,25-51) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1, 
24: 1-30: 19, Ex. C), ~ 5 Ex. D (.pdf pp 223-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 59-72), ~ 6 Ex. E (.pdf 
pp.347-48, 357-63,381-95) (Investigative Report & MedicalSOP 1-2, 105-111), ~ 8 Ex. F 
(Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24, 41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3, Exs. B, F), ~ 9 Ex. G (,pdfp. 670) 
(Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22)). 
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element. Whether I had that in my idea -- you know, in my idea 
that he had actually also done the things that we know that he had 
done, the overdose and the cutting -- I mean, intent actually -- I 
know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself. 
Q. Okay. So that - - -
A. So I had a serious-you know, I understood the seriousness of 
it. When you see my word "intent"-because, clearly, often 
people with ideation don't require a higher level of observation in 
the jail. 
Because they say, you "These thoughts are entering my head, they 
bother me, but, you know, I can manage them. I don't intend to 
die. I'm not intending to hurt myself." 
So intent-the fact that I wrote -'intent" makes me-it may have 
been even, actually, the wrong word. Maybe I meant he 
attempted? But just the fact it's there makes me know that I was 
very clear that, you know, this guy-it's been serious in the past. 
Q. SO I just want to make sure I understand. Suicidal ideation 
may be down here on the risk level. And then intent, the next 
level. And 
A. Means, available means, method, and those kinds of things 
and-
Q. Okay. 
A. -you know, planned? Means, intent--or means, method, plan, 
and then attempt, yeah, you're starting to arc way up into what you 
consider increased risk. 52 
52 R. pp. 2691-92 (Johnson Dep., 240:14-242:17) (emphasis added). 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Deputy Wroblewski summary 
judgment on the basis that he did not fail to adequately respond when the deputy knew the 
serious risk of suicide faced by the detainee? 
l. Did the trial court grant Deputy Wroblewski summary judgment on an issue not 
raised in his motion for summary judgment, thereby improperly relieving him of his 
initial burden on summary judgment? 
2. Did the trial court apply an incorrect heightened summary judgment standard by 
shifting the burden to Ms. Hoagland to prove a constitutional violation before 
Wroblewski had raised and supported that issue in his motion for summary judgment? 
3. Was the trial court's decision to grant Deputy Wroblewski summary judgment based 
on a misreading of the record? 
4. Did the trial court apply an incorrect deliberate indifference standard by requiring 
Ms. Hoagland to prove intentional act? 
B. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting the Jail's social worker, James 
Johnson, summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity? 
1. Did James Johnson's conduct violate clearly established constitutional law? 
a. Did James Johnson violate the decedent's clearly established constitutional rights 
and thereby preclude application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to avoid 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? 
1. As a matter of law can an official who acts with deliberate indifference to the 
constitutional rights of another ever be granted qualified immunity from 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? 
b. Did James Johnson violate Ms. Hoagland's clearly established constitutional 
rights and thereby preclude application of the doctrine of qualified immunity to 
avoid liability under 42 U.S. C. § 1983? 
i. Was the law sufficiently established at the relevant time to put a reasonable 
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social worker on notice that actions such as those of James Johnson would 
violate the rights of an adult child's parent by interfering with a 
constitutionally protected familial interest? 
11. Is the clearly established right at issue in a qualified immunity analysis 
involving an unconstitutional death the decedent's right or the adult parent's 
right who brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action? 
iii. Does Idaho's Probate Code give Ms. Hoagland standing to bring a 
survivorship and a wrongful death claim for the death of her son where she is 
an heir and the personal representative of his estate? 
IV. Do the underlying policies of 42 U.S.c. § 1983 preclude application of 
Idaho's abatement upon death rules where the constitutional wrong caused the 
decedent's death? 
2. Did the trial court err by confusing the reasonableness inquiry in qualified immunity 
analysis with the reasonableness inquiry used to determine when the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated? 
3. Did the trial court err by resolving conflicting expert testimony and making 
credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage, thereby denying 
Ms. Hoagland her right to trial by jury? 
a. Did the trial court view the record in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland or 
did it follow the misdirection of Nation v. State to view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the party asserting immunity? 
b. Should this Court expressly overrule that portion of Nation that conflicts with 
Saucier v. Katz and hold that, when determining the application of qualified 
immunity on a motion for summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the injured party? 
C. Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to Ada County on Ms. Hoagland's 
42 U.S.c. § 1983 claims when there was conflicting expert testimony that the Jail had been 
systematically denying and delaying medical treatment to inmates? 
D. Did the trial court err by requiring evidence of actual knowledge to satisfy the deliberate 
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indifference element of Ms. Hoagland's Fourteenth Amendment claim against a Jail supervisor 
sued in her individual capacity for failing to supervise and train? 
E. Where a Fourteenth Amendment violation results in death, does the decedent's 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim abate? 
1. Does Idaho's Probate Code §§ 5-311 and 5-327 provide standing to a personal 
representative to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 survivorship claim to vindicate the 
constitutional rights of the decedent despite the holding in Evans v. Twin Falls that 
personal claims of the decedent abate with the decedent's death? 
2. Does the Evans v. Twin Falls non-survivorship rule apply to abate all constitutional 
personal injury torts of the decedent, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims where the 
wrong complained of caused the decedent's death? 
F. Did the trial court make a mistake of law and abuse its discretion when it awarded costs 
not supported by fact or law? 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by awarding as a matter of right costs for 
attempted services fees, transcription fees for depositions that were canceled, and for 
exhibits that were not admitted into evidence at a hearing or trial? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law by awarding 
discretionary costs to the prevailing party in the amount of$77,438.12? 
a. Did the prevailing party make an adequate showing that the discretionary costs 
requested were necessary, exceptional, reasonable and justly awarded to justify 
the trial court's award? 
b. Was this case exceptional merely because it was brought as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claim in state court as opposed to either a common law negligence claim brought 
in state court or a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought in federal district court? 
c. Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the requested discretionary costs 
were necessary, exceptional, reasonable, and justly awarded against 
Ms. Hoagland? 
i. Was this case exceptional? 
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11. Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the requested discretionary 
costs were incurred because the case was exceptional? 
iii. Did the trial court make the requisite finding that the costs were necessary and 
reasonable? 
d. Did the trial court apply the ·'in the interest of justice" element of LR.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(D) correctly? 
1. Is a trial court's finding that "it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here" 
the correct express finding that is required under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)? 
e. Did the trial court err as a matter oflaw and abuse its discretion when it failed to 
make an express finding as to Ms. Hoagland's ability to pay the awarded costs? 
1. Does LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) require a trial court to consider the financial status 
of a party before it awards discretionary costs against that party? 
G. Is Ms. Hoagland entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-107 
and 12-121, LA.R. 40 and 41, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1988? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
1. Outline of claims. 
Ms. Hoagland is the mother of Bradley Munroe. Her Complaint asserts two counts under 
42 U.S.c. § 1983 based on the denial of Bradley's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care 
and safety while he was detained at the Jail. Her first count is brought in her capacity as an heir 
and personal representative of Bradley Munroe's estate. Her second count is brought in her 
individual capacity. She has brought official capacity claims against Ada County and individual 
capacity claims against certain Jail employees (collectively "Ada County Defendants"). Both 
counts allege that the Ada County Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Bradley's serious 
risk of suicide while he was a Jail inmate. Bradley committed suicide less than 24 hours after his 
incarceration. Jail records from prior incarcerations documented Bradley's history of mental 
illness and suicidality; and two of the Ada County Defendants knew Bradley was at risk for 
suicide but took no action to protect him. 
When Bradley was brought to the Jail, the officers could not complete the booking 
process with Bradley because of his bizarre behavior (suicidal statements and trying to strangle 
himself) and he was instead put on suicide watch. He remained on suicide watch until the 
following morning when the Jail's social worker, James Johnson, took Bradley off of suicide 
watch and approved him for housing in general population. Johnson reviewed Bradley's Jail 
records and in his deposition admitted that based on the records he understood that Bradley was 
at serious risk for suicide that he was planning and wanting to hurt himself. 
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Approximately 20 minutes after Johnson spoke to Bradley, a processing deputy, Jeremy 
Wroblewski, noted on the Jail's intake form which screens for suicide that Bradley told him he 
was thinking of committing suicide and had attempted it before. Wroblewski noted that Bradley 
appeared to him to be at risk for suicide. However, Wroblewski took no action to protect 
Bradley. After Wroblewski booked Bradley into the Jail, Bradley was put alone in a cell with a 
bunk bed and a bed sheet-which Bradley used to hang himself. 
2. Legal framework for Ms. Hoagland's causes of action. 
a. Individual liability. 
Pretrial detainees, such as Bradley, have a constitutional right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution to reasonable medical care and safety. 53 When a 
state restrains an individual's liberty, the Constitution imposes a duty on the state to provide 
access to basic human needs, such as medical care and safety. 54 The Eighth Amendment protects 
convicted inmates and the Fourteenth Amendment protects detainees, but the analysis used by 
the courts is the same under both Amendments. 55 
A jail official may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries arising out of the 
official's deliberate indifference to a detainee's constitutional rightS.56 "Deliberate indifference" 
has a subjective element and an objective element: 
53 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-103 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-30 
(1994); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). 
54 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). 
55 Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F. 3d 1175, 1189, n.9 (9th Cir. 2002); Frohmader v. 
Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1028 (1oth Cir. 1992). 
-6 ) Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-103; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828; Doty, 37 F.3d at 546. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 16 
[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment 
for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows 
that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards 
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 57 
The subjective element is a question of fact which can be proven by direct or circumstantial 
'd 58 eVl ence. 
Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a 
substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the 
usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and 
a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. 59 
The question of fact under the objective prong is whether the officer acted reasonably under the 
circumstances.6o 
Within the jail suicide context, a jailer may be held liable for a detainee's suicide when 
the official: (1) knew the detainee faced a substantial risk of self-harm; and (2) disregarded that 
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 61 
b. Individual liability of supervisors and high ranking officials. 
Under § 1983, a supervisor's "liability hinges upon his participation in thc deprivation of 
57 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847 (emphasis added). 
58 !d. 
59 [d. 
60 !d. at 844-47. 
61 Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2006); Bradich ex rel. Estate of Bradich v. City of 
Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 690-92 (7th Cir. 2005); Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601, 605-6 
(8th Cir. 2004); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded by 131 S. Ct. 1812, reinstated in part by 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); Conn v. City of 
Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1096-1098 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded by, 131 S. Ct. 1812, reinstated 
in part by, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); Snow ex reI. Snow v. City of Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 
1268 (11 th Cir. 2005). 
APPELLANT S BRIEF - 17 
constitutional rights. ,,62 Such participation can include ;'setting in motion a series of acts by 
others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the 
constitutional injury. ,,63 It also may include creating a policy or custom under which 
unconstitutional practices occur; allowing such a policy or custom to continue; or being grossly 
negligent in the management of the subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. 64 
A supervisor is grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent when he "knew or should 
have known" that there was a high degree of risk that a subordinate would violate someone's 
rights but "either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take action that a 
reasonable supervisor would find necessary to prevent such a risk, and that failure caused a 
constitutional injury. ,,65 
62 Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 
140 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
63 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1342 (9th Cir. 1990). 
64 Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865,873 (2nd Cir. 1995); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319,323-4 
(2nd Cir. 1986); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5 th Cir. 1996); Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 
298,303-04 (5th Cir. 1987); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675,679-81 (5th Cir. 1980); Simms v. 
Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Ghandi v. Police Dept. of Detroit, 747 F2d 338 (6th Cir. 
1984); Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216 (8th Cir. 1994); Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th 
Cir.1987); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 972 (1992)); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,645-46 (9th Cir. 1991); Ybarra v. 
Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, et al., 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1984); Meade v. 
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10 th Cir. 1988); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695-96 
(1oth Cir. 1979); In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235 (D.C. Conn. 1995); Liability of 
Supervisory Officials and Governmental Entities for Having Failed to Adequately Train, 
Supervise, or Control Individual Police Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil Rights Under 
42 US.C.A. § 1983, 70 A.L.R. Fed. 17 (1984) and Cumulative Supplement. 
65 Poe, 282 F.3d at 142. 
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c. Municipal liability official capacity claims. 
Official capacity claims are effectively claims against the municipality.66 A plaintiff may 
prevail on an official capacity claim under § 1983 by showing deliberate indifference in the 
"execution of a governmenfs policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy," that was a moving force in 
inflicting a constitutional injury. 67 A claim against a municipality may be established either by 
direct liability or by liability by omission.68 
i. Direct liability 
To establish direct liability, it must be shown "that a municipality itself violated 
someone's rights or that it directed its employee to do SO.,,69 It holds municipalities liable for 
their official acts pursuant to their policies, regulations, customs, or usages.70 To prevail under a 
direct liability theory, the following elements are required: (l) the county must have had a 
policy, regulation, custom, or usage that posed a substantial risk to the plaintiff; (2) it must have 
been aware that its policy posed this risk; and (3) its policy, regulation, custom, or usage was a 
moving force behind the constitutional violation.71 The entity's awareness can be shown by 
direct or circumstantial evidence. 72 
66 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). 
67 Monell v. Dep 't a/Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
68 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185-86. 
69 Id. at 1185. 
70 Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). 
71 Id.; Gibson, 290 F .3d at 1188. 
72 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1190. 
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A plaintiff may prove a municipality operates under an unofficial policy by showing 
evidence of a "persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which ... is so 
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that represents municipal policy:,73 A single 
instance of medical care denied or delayed is generally insufficient to establish municipal 
liability on the basis of a custom or usage. However, repeated examples of such failures may 
support a finding of deliberate indifference and result in municipal liability. 74 
ii. Liability by omission 
A plaintiff can prove a municipal's liability through its omission by showing either: (1) a 
failure to train; (2) a failure to implement constitutionally sound policies; (3) a failure to address 
the deficient performance of staff; or (4) a failure to discipline employees for not following 
written policy.75 Liability arises where (1) a county employee violated the plaintiffs rights, 
(2) the county's omission amounted to deliberate indifference, and (3) the omission was a 
moving force behind the employee violating the plaintiffs rights. 76 The county's failure to act 
11 . . 77 genera y presents a Jury questIOn. 
73 Bennett v. City o/Slidell, 735 F.2d 861,862 (5 th Cir. 1984). 
74 Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.) (deliberate indifference shown by repeated 
examples of negligent acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staft), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (citing Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48,52 (2nd Cir. 1977)); Turpin v. 
Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201-02 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("'a single, unusually brutal or egregious beating 
administered by a group of municipal employees may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to 
warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 
deliberate indifference or "gross negligence" on the part of officials in charge"). 
75 City o/Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,389 (1989); Conn, 591 F.2d at 1102-5; Gibson, 
290 F.3dat 1194; Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,1478 (9th Cir. 1992). 
76 Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-91; Gibson, 290 F.3d 1194. 
77 Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1478. 
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A municipality is deliberately indifferent when a policymaker's omission "is so obvious, 
and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rightS:,78 'The need to act 
may be obvious because any reasonable person would recognize the need.,,79 
Deliberate indifference under an omission theory does not contain a subjective 
component. 80 In training, adoption of sound policies, supervision and discipline cases, deliberate 
indifference maybe established by a policymaker's gross negligence.8l 
B. It Was Reversible Error To Grant Wroblewski Summary Judgment 
The trial court erred in several ways when it granted Wroblewski summary judgment: 
First, the trial court granted summary judgment on an issue not properly raised in his motion. 
Second, the trial court mistakenly believed that § 1983 cases should be treated differently on 
summary judgment than all other cases. Third, the trial court misconstrued the record by 
concluding that Wroblewski's suicide screening took place simultaneously with the social 
worker's assessment. Finally, the trial court applied an incorrect deliberate indifference 
standard. 
78 Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. 
79 Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1195. 
80 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841). 
81 Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1379-80 (1 st Cir. 1995); Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 
196, 202 (2nd Cir. 1980); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3 rd Cir. 
1976); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381,385 (7th Cir. 1979); White v. Washington Public Power, 
692 F.2d 1286,1289-90 (9th Cir. 1982); Brooks v. Sheib, 813 F.2d 1191,1193 (lIth Cir. 1987); 
see also Liability of Supervisory Officials and Governmental Entities for Having Failed to 
Adequately Train, Supervise, or Control Individual Police Officers Who Violate Plaintiff's Civil 
Rights Under 42 US.C.A. § 1983,70 A.L.R. Fed. 17 (originally published in 1984) and cases 
cited therein. 
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1. Standard of review on appeal of a grant of summary judgment. 
This Court's review of an appeal from an order of summary judgment is de novo and it 
applies the same standards used by the trial court.82 A grant of summary judgment is warranted 
where it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.,,83 The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party.84 "The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests at 
all times upon the moving party.,·S5 
2. The trial court considered issues not properly raised. 
The trial court erred by granting Wroblewski summary judgment on an issue not properly 
raised or supported by his Restated Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court held that 
even though Wroblewski was subjectively aware of Bradley's serious medical need, Wroblewski 
could not be held liable under § 1983 because "he did not fail to adequately respond to that 
need."S6 That issue was not properly raised or supported by the motion for summary judgment. 
A trial court commits reversible error when it grants summary judgment on issues not 
raised and supported in the motion for summary judgment.87 A motion for summary judgment 
"shall state with particularity the grounds therefor.,,88 "[I]f the movant does not challenge an 
82 Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008). 
83 LR.C.P. 56(c). 
84 Renzo v. Idaho State Dep 't, of Agric., 149 Idaho 777, 779, 241 P.3d 950,952 (2010). 
85 Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004) (emphasis added), 
86 R. pp. 2346-47; compare with R. pp. 75-178,288-763, 818-91, 942-83, 1451-1540, 1668-69, 
1672-96,2046-2197,2254-76,2308-14,2315-56; Tr. (12110110), 187:1-236:22. 
87 Thomson v, Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527,530-531 (1994); 
88 LR.C.P. 7(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
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aspect of the nonmovanfs case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it 
at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.,,89 
Once a party satisfies the particularity requirement, the moving party must still carry its 
"initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" on the issues raised in 
the motion.9o Otherwise, the nonmoving party has no burden to respond with supporting 
evidence.91 
Here, Wroblewski's Restated Motion for Summary Judgment did not state any particular 
grounds for summary judgment, and instead moved generally "upon the grounds and for the 
reason that there are no genuine issues of fact and that the Defendants are entitled to judgment as 
a matter oflaw.,,92 Wroblewski also did not prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
on any of the necessary elements of Ms. Hoagland case. 93 
The closest Wroblewski came to raising the issue on which the trial court granted him 
summary judgment was in his Reply Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in his Rebuttal Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 94 In the Reply memorandum, Wroblewski argued for the first time that he had not 
been deliberately indifferent.95 However, Wroblewski did not identify anything in the record 
89 Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531. 
90 Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. v., 148 Idaho 89, 101 (2009); Esser Elec. v. Lost River 
Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919 (2008). 
91 Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101; Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531. 
92 R. p. 1668. 
93 R. pp. 1672-96,2046-2197,2254-76,2308-12. 
94 R. pp. 2254-76, 2308-12. 
95 R. pp. 2254-76. 
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showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to that argument.96 Wroblewski wrote: 
Also, in the interest of efficiency, the "individual capacity" New 
Defendants97 will refrain from restating the events that transpired 
during Mr. Munroe's last incarceration beginning September 28, 
2008, since they have already been set forth in the May 28, 2010 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at pages 20 
through 24, which is incorporated herein by reference.98 
Even if the trial court accepted this incorporation by reference, the record cited was insufficient 
to meet the burden of raising an issue and proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
as to any element of the case.99 
There was only a passing reference to Wroblewski on the pages referenced with no 
citation to the record. IOO Wroblewski's affidavit and Johnson's affidavit were later cited on 
pages 4 and 5 of the Reply memorandum, but the factual statements in the memorandum 
misrepresented the affidavit testimony. 101 
As for Wroblewski's Rebuttal memorandum, the only reference to whether Wroblewski 
had responded adequately to Bradley's need was the following: 
96 R. p. 2272. 
In addition to Plaintiffs failure to identify personal involvement of 
the bulk of the Defendants in this matter, she has cited no facts 
demonstrating that the remaining Defendants (Wroblewski and 
Johnson) (i) subjectively knew Munroe would likely commit 
suicide and (ii) intentionally disregarded the risk, as is required 
under the deliberate indifference standard injail suicide cases. 102 
97 The Ada County Defendants were referred to as the "New Defendants" in the memorandum. 
98 R. p. 2272. 
99 See R. pp. 98-102. 
100 R. p. 100. 
101 R. pp. 82-83. 
102 R. p. 2312. 
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That bare statement is insufficient to shift the burden to Ms. Hoagland to respond since it was in 
rebuttal and therefore untimely; and Wroblewski failed to support the assertion by presentation 
of evidence showing an absence of a genuine issue of material fact on those issues. 
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Wroblewski summary judgment based on its finding that 
Wroblewski "was subjectively aware of a serious medical need, but that he did not fail to 
adequately respond to that need:,103 
Whether Wroblewski responded reasonably is certainly part of the deliberate indifference 
inquiry, but that was not an issue raised in the Restated Motion for Summary Judgment. 104 In the 
Memorandum in Support of Restated Motion for Summary Judgment, the Ada County 
Defendants raised the following four issues, of which only the second applied to Wroblewski: 
(i) the government entity and individuals acting in their "official 
capacity" are not appropriate defendants in this lawsuit, (ii) the 
individuals acting in their "individual capacity" are entitled to the 
protections of immunities under federal law that precludes liability, 
(iii) Hoagland improperly attempts to invent constitutional 
standards that do not exist, and (iv) Hoagland has sought improper 
damages. 105 
As to the immunity issue, the argument was limited to two discrete questions: (1) whether 
Ms. Hoagland had a constitutional right that was enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and if so, 
(2) whether the law was sufficiently established at the time to have put Wroblewski on notice 
that his actions violated that right. 106 
103 R. pp. 2346-47. 
104 R. p. 1668. 
105 R. p. 1675. 
106 R. pp. 1683-90. 
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The qualified immunity argument was raised purely as a legal issue. The Ada County 
Defendants argued that a parent of an adult child has no constitutionally protected interest in her 
adult son' s death that would support a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. I 07 They also argued that 
even if such a right existed, the law was not clearly established at the time of Bradley's death, 
and therefore, Wroblewski would be entitled to qualified immunity. 108 The factual issue of 
whether Wroblewski reasonably responded to a known need was not raised or argued, and it was 
improper for the Court to rule on the issue. 
3. The trial court applied an incorrect summary judgment standard. 
The trial court erred by grafting an "additional element" onto the summary judgment 
standard merely because this is a § 1983 claim. l09 
As is always the case at the summary judgment stage, when determining whether a 
genuine issue of material fact exists, a trial court is bound to view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.IIO Here, however, the trial court mistakenly believed that 
because this is a § 1983 case, it should be treated different! y than all other cases for summary 
judgment purposes. In setting out the standard it applied to the summary judgment motion, the 
trial court made the following incorrect conclusion oflaw: 
Generally, liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. If reasonable people 
could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences 
107 See R. pp. 1672-96. 
108 Id. 
109 R. p. 2329. 
110 Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530. 
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from the evidence, the motion should be denied. 
Summary judgment of § 1983 cases involves an additional 
element of analysis. In § 1983 cases, plaintiff bears the burden of 
proof on the Constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, 
and must come forward with sufficient evidence to create a 
genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment. III 
The conclusion oflaw reached by the trial court tips LR.C.P. 56 on its head by placing the initial 
burden of proof at the summary judgment stage on the wrong party. 
The trial court cited McAllister v. Price I 12 for the idea that summary judgment in § 1983 
cases involves "an additional element" requiring the plaintiff to prove a constitutional violation 
irrespective of whether a defendant has properly raised the issue and whether reasonable people 
could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the facts.113 However, 
McAllister does not stand for that proposition, and to the extent that it does, McAllister is an 
incorrect statement of the law. 
In McAllister, the Seventh Circuit stated the summary judgment standards it applied in a 
§ 1983 case: 
We review de novo an appeal from a district court's denial of 
summary judgment to a defendant who claims qualified immunity. 
Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2009). We 
construe the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-
movant and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. 
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 
case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the constitutional 
deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must come forth with 
sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact to 
III R. p. 2329 (case citations omitted; emphasis added). 
112 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010). 
113 R. p. 2329. 
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avoid summary judgment. Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 583 
(7th Cir. 2006).114 
Having cited Johnson v. Snyder, the McAllister court may have inadvertently suggested that a 
§ 1983 plaintiff has an additional burden on summary judgment. However, there are three 
reasons that the trial court in this case should have rejected that suggestion. First, read correctly, 
jVlcAllister merely states which party has the ultimate burden of proof in the case. Second, if 
jVlcAllister did interject such a requirement, it did so without support in the law since nowhere in 
the decision did the Johnson court impose such an "additional analysis." 
The United States Supreme Court has disavowed treating § 1983 cases any differently 
under the rules of civil procedure than other cases. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit,II5 the Court held that it was reversible error to subject § 1983 
claims to heightened pleading standards. II6 The Court explained that the liberal pleading rules of 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be applied any differently to § 1983 
cases than to any other case. II7 By extension, there is no more reason to apply heightened 
summary judgment standards to § 1983 cases under Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is true that Ms. Hoagland has the ultimate burden of proof at trial, but that does not 
mean that at the summary judgment stage she has an additional burden of proof. The trial court's 
importation of an additional element of proof into the summary judgment standard was 
114 McAllister, 615 F.3d at 88l. 
lIS 507 U.S. 163, 168 (U.S. 1993). 
1I6 Id. 
117 !d. 
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reversible error. 
4. The trial court misread the record. 
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Wroblewski based on a 
misreading of the record. lI8 The trial court confused the timing of when the Jail's social worker 
spoke with Bradley and when Wroblewski concluded that Bradley appeared to be at risk of 
suicide. Because of the trial court's misunderstanding, it mistakenly believed that Wroblewski 
reasonably relied on the social worker's assessment and thereby "did not fail to adequately 
respond" to Bradley's serious medical need. I 19 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court initially set forth the events surrounding 
Wroblewski's interaction with Bradley in a relatively accurate manner, making the following 
findings of fact: (1) Wroblewski began the booking process with Bradley when (2) he was 
interrupted by social worker Johnson who (3) then spoke with Bradley for several minutes and 
left, (4) leaving Wroblewski to finish the booking of Bradley. 120 Consistent with the record, the 
trial court found that Bradley answered "Yes" to the following questions in the suicide risk 
screening that Wroblewski conducted during the booking process: (1) "Have you ever been in a 
118 Compare R. pp. 2333-38, 2346-47 (1120111 Mem. Dec. & Order), with R. pp. 135-144,2073-
79 (Overson Aff., "2-14, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 575-656) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3, 19:10-19, 
20:22-29:15,31:12-32:1,33:18-35:24,67:4-70:4, Ex. B (Wroblewski written statement), Ex. C 
(Diagram), Ex. D (Aff. of Wroblewski), Ex. E (Booking Documents - Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 90-
91), Ex. F (Security Check Log), Ex. G (booking video), Ex. H (Jail Policy), Ex. I (Jail Policy), 
Ex. J (Jail Policies), Ex. K (Intake Processing Policy), Ex. L (Jail Records», , 6, Ex. E (.pdf 
pp. 393-94) (Investigative Report, pp. 12-13),2128-29,2131. 
119 See R. pp. 2346-47. 
120 R. pp. 2324-25. 
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mental institution or had psychiatric careT'; (2) "Have you ever contemplated suicide?"; and 
(3) "Are you now contemplating suicideTI21 The Court wrote the following: "A final question 
on the questionnaire required Wroblewski to answer: 'Does the inmate's behavior suggest a risk 
of suicide?' Wroblewski responded 'yes.'" 122 
Despite the relative accuracy of the trial court's findings earlier in its Memorandum 
Decision, when the trial court assessed the individual liability of Wroblewski, it collapsed the 
portion of the timeline during which Johnson spoke to Bradley and when Wroblewski asked 
Bradley the suicide screening questions. 123 In that section of its Memorandum Decision, the trial 
court wrote the following: 
121 R. p. 2325. 
122 !d. 
As Wroblewski was asking Munroe about thoughts of and 
history of suicide, Psychiatric Social Worker James Johnson 
arrived to discuss the same topics. Johnson completed his 
assessment before Wroblewski completed the booking process. 
When the booking was finished, it was not clear to Wroblewski 
that he still needed to call the HSU, because he had actual 
knowledge that Munroe had been simultaneously assessed by 
HSU. Wroblewski knew that James Johnson or someone in 
Johnson's department was the proper party to receive Munroe's 
intake form. However, Wroblewski also knew that Johnson had 
already interviewed Munroe. If Wroblewski had followed 
procedure, he would have re-informed the HSU. However, he was 
new on the job and, more importantly, in his judgment Munroe had 
received the assessment that was required. Additionally, 
Wroblewski's trainer was present and did not indicate to 
Wroblewski that [sic] needed to follow Up.124 
123 R. p. 2346, L. 4-24. 
124 R. p. 2346, L. 14-24 (emphasis added). 
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On that basis, the trial court granted Wroblewski summary judgment, finding that he did not 
d · d I 125 respon ma equate y. 
In reaching its conclusions, the trial court misconstrued the record in several respects. 
Most importantly, the trial court failed to recognize that Wroblewski did not start asking Bradley 
about suicide until approximately 20 minutes after social worker Johnson left the area. 126 At 
8:00 a.m., Wroblewski started fingerprinting Bradley.127 At 8:01 a.m., Johnson arrived and 
spoke with Bradley until 8:04 a.m., at which time Johnson left the area. 128 While Johnson spoke 
with Bradley, Wroblewski continued to fingerprint Bradley. 129 Wroblewski finished the 
fi .. 8 05 130 mgerpnntmg process at : a.m. From 8:06 a.m. to 8:34 a.m., Bradley placed four 
telephone calls from the Jail.l3l Sometime after that, Wroblewski put Bradley into a different 
office and started asking Bradley the questions on the intake health questionnaire. 132 
During the questioning process, Wroblewski noted that Bradley's appearance was "poor" 
125 R. p. 2347, L. 1-15. 
126 R. pp. 135-140,2073-77 (Overson Aff." 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577-82, 584-86, 590-91, 598-604, 
621-23,650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-19:3,19:10-19,20:22-29:15, 31:12-32:1, 33:18-35:24, 
45:17-51:4,67:4-70:4, Exs. B, G-F, L)), 2128-29, 2131. 
127 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., (.pdf pp. 582-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski 
Dep., 37:10-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)). 
128 Id.; see also R. pp. 183-87. 
129 R. pp. 183-87, 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623) 
(Wroblewski Dep., 37:10-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)). 
130 Id. 
131 R. pp. 729-30, 1398-1407, 2074 (Overson Aff., ,~ 2, 5, Ex. A (.pdf pp. 10, 60) (Robertson 
Dep., Ex. D), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 389-90) (Investigative Report, pp. 8-9)). 
132 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 583-84, 590-91, 598-610, 623) (Wroblewski 
Dep., 40:9-14, 44:23-45:16, 67:4-70:4, Exs. B-E, G)). 
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and he looked sick, smelled of alcohol and appeared to be under the influence of alcoho1. 133 
Bradley told Wroblewski he had been on Celexa, which is a common antidepressant. 134 During 
the questioning, Bradley told Wroblewski he was seeing visions (,'Shadow People") and hearing 
voices telling him to run; that he had been hospitalized recently in a mental health institution for 
psychiatric care; that he had contemplated suicide; and that he had attempted suicide in the 
past. 135 Bradley answered "Yes" when Wroblewski asked him the question, "Are you now 
contemplating suicideT 136 
Wroblewski answered "Yes" to the question, "Does the inmate's behavior suggest a 
risk of suicide?,,137 At the time of the interview with Bradley, Wroblewski understood that it 
was Jail policy that if the answers to the suicide questions were "yes" the officer must contact the 
medical unit. 138 Despite "yes" answers to the most important suicide questions, Wroblewski 
told no one that Bradley appeared to be at risk of committing suicide, and took no action to 
abate the risk. 139 
The trial court clearly misunderstood the record and believed that Wroblewski questioned 
133 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff, (.pdfpp. 586,606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 51:7-52:25, 
Ex. E». 
134 !d. 
135 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff, (.pdfpp. 588-89, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 59:1-63:17, 
Ex. E». 
136 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 586, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 53:18-20, 
Ex. E». 
137 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff, ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 589, 606-10) (Wroblewski Dep., 65:1-6, 
Ex. E». 
138 R. p.2075 (Overson Aff., (.pdf pp. 591, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 70:19-73:8, 
Exs. H-K»; see R. pp. 2896-2900 for testimony of how the policies worked in practice. 
139 Id. 
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Bradley simultaneously with Johnson's assessment of Bradley. The trial court's mistake of fact 
led to its conclusion that Wroblewski's conduct was mere negligence. When the record is read 
correctly and the facts are construed in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland, it is clear that 
summary judgment should have been denied. A reasonable jury could have found that 
Wroblewski's failure to alert anyone that Bradley had answered "yes" to the most important 
suicide questions while Wroblewski himself concluded that Bradley appeared to be at risk of 
suicide, amounted to deliberate indifference. 
In addition to the trial court's misunderstanding of the events surrounding Bradley being 
assessed for suicide risk, the trial court also misunderstood the extent of Wroblewski's training 
and his understanding of the Jail's suicide risk prevention policies. The trial court emphasized 
the fact that Wroblewski was in his last week of training at the Jail when he interacted with 
Bradley. 140 The trial court failed to consider that Wroblewski had worked at the Idaho 
Department of Correction in a maximum security facility prior to working at the Jail, and had 
training in suicide reduction during that period. 141 The trial court discounted the fact that 
Wroblewski had been through POST twice and received suicide prevention training on both 
occasions. 142 The trial court also failed to recognize that Wroblewski admitted that he 
understood the Jail's policies on suicide reduction on September 29, 2008, prior to Bradley's 
death; and he knew what actions were required of him when the suicide questions were answered 
140 R. pp. 2346-47. 
141 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 575) (Wroblewski Oep., 7:9-8:16). 
142 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 575-76) (Wroblewski Oep., 9:13-10:22). 
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in the affirmative. 143 
The trial court incorrectly perceived Wroblewski as an inexperienced security officer 
who was conducting his duties under the direct supervision of a trainer who also knew that the 
suicide questions were answered in the affirmative. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court 
wrote, "Additionally, Wroblewski's trainer was present and did not indicate to Wroblewski that 
[sic] needed to follow Up.,,144 But there was no evidence in the record for that finding. 145 
The trial court clearly erred in its determination that while "Wroblewski was subjectively 
aware of a serious medical need, he did not fail to adequately respond to that need.,,146 The error 
arose from misreading the record. A correct reading of the record demonstrates that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed that should have precluded summary judgment. 
5. The trial court applied the wrong defmition of deliberate indifference. 
The trial court applied the wrong definition of deliberate indifference to Ms. Hoagland's 
claims. 147 The trial court defined deliberate indifference as follows: "For individual capacity 
defendants, it must be shown that the defendant: (1) subjectively knew the prisoner was at 
substantial risk of committing suicide and (2) intentionally disregarded the risk:,148 The trial 
court's definition imposed on Ms. Hoagland a significantly higher standard of proof than the law 
143 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff.,,-r 8, Ex. F (.pdfpp. 577, 592-94, 624-48) (Wroblewski Dep., 14:14-
24,15:16-16:12,75:17-85:25, Exs. H-K)). 
144 R. p. 2346, L. 23-24. 
145 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff.,,-r 8, Ex. F (.pdfp. 576) (Wroblewski Dep., 10:23-12:1). 
146 R. p. 2347. 
147 R. p. 2330. 
148 Id. (emphasis added). 
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reqUlres. 
Within the jail suicide context, a jail official may be held liable for a detainee's suicide 
when the official (1) knew the detainee faced a substantial risk of serious self-harm, and 
(2) disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 149 The second prong 
of the deliberate indifference standard is one of reasonableness and does not require the plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant acted intentionally to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional 
rights. 150 
The trial court committed reversible error when it applied an intentional standard to 
Ms. Hoagland's claims and thereby found that Wroblewski was not liable under the second 
prong of the deliberate indifference requirement. By applying the more rigorous intentional 
standard, the trial court incorrectly dismissed Wroblewski because "he did not fail to adequately 
respond.,·15l Had the trial court applied the correct definition of deliberate indifference, it would 
have by necessity found that a genuine issue of material fact existed that precluded summary 
149 Bowen v. City of Manchester, 966 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1992); Colburn v. Upper Darby 
Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3 rd Cir. 1991); Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1992) (Goldberg concurring); Jaco 
v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1984); Bradich ex rei. Estate of Bradich v. City of 
Chicago, 413 F.3d 688, 690-92 (7th Cir. 2005); Wever v. Lincoln County, 388 F.3d 601,605-6 
(8th Cir. 2004); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010); Conn 
v. City 0/ Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1096-1098 (9th Cir. Nev. 2010); Cabrales v. County of Los 
Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir.), judgment vacated by 490 U.S. 1087 for further consideration 
in light of City o/Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), and judgment reinstated by 886 
F.2d 235, cert. denied 494 U.S. 1091 (1990); Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862, 865 
(10th Cir. 1997); Snow ex ref. Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL, 420 F .3d 1262, 1268 (11 th Cir. 
2005); Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159,162 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
150 Farmer, 511 U.S. 847. 
15l R. p. 2347. 
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judgment. 
6. Conclusion. 
There are multiple independent grounds upon which this Court should reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to Wroblewski. First, the trial court granted Wroblewski's 
motion for summary judgment on an issue not properly raised and supported by his motion. 
Second, the trial court placed a heightened burden on Ms. Hoagland based on the mistaken belief 
that § 1983 cases should be treated differently at the summary judgment stage than all other 
cases. Third, the trial court misconstrued the record by concluding that Wroblewski's suicide 
screening took place simultaneously with Johnson's assessment of Bradley. Finally, the trial 
court applied the wrong deliberate indifference standard. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for trial. 
C. James Johnson Is Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity 
The trial court granted social worker Johnson summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity.152 Specifically, the trial court ruled as follows: 
In Summary, while the facts as Ms. Hoagland has alleged them 
may make out a violation by Johnson of a constitutional right, the 
Court finds that a reasonable jail social worker would not have 
thought he was acting with deliberate indifference toward Munroe 
on September 29, 2008, by clearing Munroe from suicide watch, 
and therefore, the right Hoagland alleges was violated was not 
clearly established at that time. 153 
The trial court erred in several respects in its March 28, 2011 order granting Johnson summary 
152 R. p. 3499. 
153 Id. 
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judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. First, the trial court incorrectly found as a matter 
of law that even though Johnson knew Bradley was at risk of serious harm and took no 
reasonable action to abate that risk, under like circumstances a reasonable social worker would 
not know that such inaction was in violation of the Constitution. Second, the trial court 
incorrectly applied an analysis that confused the reasonable-notice standard for qualified 
immunity with the reasonableness standard for determining when the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution has been violated. Third, the trial court erred by viewing the facts in a 
light most favorable to Johnson's claim of qualified immunity by resolving conflicting expert 
testimony, making credibility determinations, and accepting Johnson's self-serving testimony at 
face value. 
1. Johnson violated clearly established constitutional rights and is therefore not 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
Johnson is not entitled to qualified immunity because he violated Bradley's clearly 
established constitutional rights. Qualified immunity does not shield officials from liability 
where a clearly established constitutional right has been violated. 154 Where "officers are on 
notice that their conduct is unlawful" qualified immunity is not available as a defense. 155 
Qualified immunity is only available where the official's action was objectively reasonable as 
"assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.,,156 
154 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). 
1-5 ) Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 
156 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 865 (2011). 
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There is no subjective element to the clearly-established-law prong of the analysis. 15? It is a 
purely objective standard. 158 
"For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.,,159 
This is not to say, of course, that the single warning standard points 
to a single level of specificity sufficient in every instance. In some 
circumstances, as when an earlier case expressly leaves open 
whether a general rule applies to the particular type of conduct at 
issue, a very high degree of prior factual particularity may be 
necessary. But general statements of the law are not inherently 
incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a 
general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law 
may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, 
even though "the very action in question has [not] previously been 
held unlawful." 160 
A court must look to its own and all other relevant precedents when determining whether the law 
is clearly established. 161 
Whether the law is clearly established is a question of law to be resolved de novo on 
appeal. 162 Whether the official's conduct violated a clearly established right is question of 
fact. 163 The factual record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 164 
1-7 ) Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. 
158 !d. at 812; Houghton v. South, 965 Fold 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992). 
159 Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40. 
16° Id. at 740-741 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,263 (1997)). 
161 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865; see Elderv. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
162 Miller, 150 Idaho at 865. 
163 Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 318-320 
(U.S. 1995) (where genuine material issue of fact exists as to the officer's conduct, a denial of 
qualified immunity is not appealable). 
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a. Bradley's clearly established constitutional rights. 
Johnson's conduct violated Bradley's clearly established rights. The contours of 
Bradley's right to health and safety were well established by many cases holding that a jailer 
violates a detainee's constitutional rights when he knows the detainee faces a substantial risk of 
self-harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm. 165 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied qualified immunity to a prison psychologist on 
facts similar to those in this case. In Comstock v. McCrary, the defendant psychologist 
"reevaluated" the prisoner "briefly" by speaking to him for 30 minutes and then removing the 
prisoner from suicide status based on the face value of the prisoner's statement that he was no 
longer suicidal. 166 The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that "he did not 
perceive that there was a substantial risk of harm" to the inmate and that he was entitled to 
qualified immunity because he had used reasonable medical judgment to reach that 
conclusion. 167 The Court found that there were sufficient facts to find the defendant had been 
deliberately indifferent by performing a "cursory evaluation" and denied the defendant's motion 
164 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319; compare Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001) (Taken in the 
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's 
conduct violated a constitutional right?") with Nation v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 187 (2007) ("First, 
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting immunity, did the alleged conduct violate 
a constitutional right?') 
165 See supra notes 61, 149; see also 60 Am. Jur. 2d PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL Etc. § 207 
(Suicide) (2008) (cataloging cases that hold that a jail official violates an inmate's constitutional 
rights when the official is deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of suicide); Civil liability of 
prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner, 79 A.L.R.3d 1210 
(Originally published in 1977) (same). 
166 273 F.3d 693,699-700 (6th Cir. 2002). 
167 !d. at 700. 
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for summary judgment. 168 The Court made its decision based on the defendant's brief 
evaluation, failure to review the prisoner's records, failure to check log books kept by the control 
center, and failure to complete a written health record prior to taking the inmate off suicide 
status. 169 The Court also looked to the experts' testimony that the defendanfs conduct was 
"grossly substandard.,,17o The Court then turned to the question of whether clearly established 
law existed at the time to put the defendant on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional. 171 
The Court concluded that "a reasonable prison psychologist in 1995 'would have clearly 
understood that [he] was under an affinnative duty' to offer reasonable medical care to a prisoner 
whom he knew to be suicidal, in the circumstances confronted by him.,,172 
Here, the trial court found that Johnson knew of the serious risk of hann faced by 
Bradley, and failed to take the appropriate actions to alleviate that risk. 173 That was a correct 
finding. Where the trial court erred was by concluding as a matter of law that a reasonable social 
worker in Johnson's circumstances would not be on notice in light of then existing law that his 
inaction was unconstitutional. 174 Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the law was abundantly 
clear by September 29, 2008, that if a jail social worker knows an inmate is at risk of self-harm, 
the United States Constitution imposes an affinnative duty to take reasonable steps to abate the 
168 Id. at 704, 
169 Id. at 703-04. 
170 Id. at 708-11. 
171 !d. at 711. 
172 Id. (citation omitted). 
173 R. pp. 2347-50; 3494-99. 
174 R. pp. 3498-99, 
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risk. l75 Johnson knew "that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt himself." l76 It is simply 
inconceivable that a reasonable social worker in Johnson's circumstances would not know that 
the failure to take reasonable action to protect Bradley was a constitutional violation. l77 The 
Comstock case along with all of the other suicide cases from around the country served as fair 
notice to anyone in Johnson's situation that a failure to act was unconstitutional. 
b. Ms. Hoagland's clearly established constitutional rights. 
Johnson's conduct violated the clearly established rights of Ms. Hoagland. The contours 
of Ms. Hoagland's rights in her familial relationship with her son were sufficiently established 
by the existence of numerous cases where parents of adult children, and other similar familial 
relationships, were found to have had a constitutionally protected familial interest that was 
invaded by a jailer's deliberate indifference toward a prisoner. l78 
IT ) See supra note 165. 
176 R. pp. 2695. 
l77 The record amply supports a finding that Johnson knew Bradley faced a serious risk of self-
injury. See R. pp. 131-44, 148-50, 151-54, 159-69, 290-93 (Overson Aff., ~~ 25-29, 33-34, 62, 
Exs. 13-17,23),1402-5 (Overson Aff., ~~ 15-19,25),1437-40 (Overson Aff., ~ 2, Ex. A (video 
CD)), 2073-77 (Overson Aff., ~~2-14, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 6-14,21-79) (Robertson Dep., pp. 17:1-
41 :20, Exs. B-D), ~ 5, Ex. D (.pdf pp. 207-308) (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 1-176), ~ 6, Ex. E (.pdf 
pp. 347-48, 357-63, 381-95) (Investigative Report pp. 3, 8-10, 12-13 & MedicalSOP 1-2, 81-2, 
105-11), ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 577-82, 590-91, 598-604, 623, 650-51) (Wroblewski Dep., 17:4-
19:3, 19:10-19,20:22-29:15, 31:12-32:1, 33:18-35:24, 39:1-24, 41:11-45:15, 59:2-22, 60:17-
70:4, Ex. B (statement), Ex. G (video CD), Ex. L (Security Log)), ~ 9, Ex. G (.pdfpp. 670, 673) 
(Defs' 5th Supp. Resp. 22, 25), 2080-90, 2091-2197, 2626-28 (Overson Aff., ~13ea), Ex. 11 
(video CD), ~ Bee), Ex. 13 (video CD), ~ 14, Ex. 15 (Ex. PP-Jail Cell Photos; Ex. QQ-Arm 
Photo)), 2631-2702, 3012-30. 
178 McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Brazier v. 
Cherry, 293 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 
239 (6 th Cir. 1984); Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City a/Milwaukee, 
746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 (7th Cir. 1984); Trujillo v. Board o/County Commissioners o/Santa Fe, 
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The Ninth Circuit, in Strandberg v. City of Helena, held that parents of a 22-year-old who 
hung himself in jail could proceed with a § 1983 action against jail officials for a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. 179 That case was decided in 1982 and thus provided ample notice that 
conduct such as Johnson's violates the Constitution. 
Johnson also had notice that he could be sued under § 1983 by Bradley's heirs because 
the law was clear that § 1988 would be read to incorporate Idaho's wrongful death and 
survivorship statutes in order to provide an adult child's parent with standing to sue under § 1983 
for a constitutional violation resulting in the child's death.I80 Clearly established law in 2008 
was that I.C. §§ 5-311, 5-327 and 15-1-201 provided Ms. Hoagland standing to bring her 
claims. 181 Since at least 1908, this Court has recognized loss of society and companionship as an 
element of damages in a wrongful death case, and since then, this Court has read § 5-311 (1) 
expansively to recognize a presumption of loss of companionship damages in certain wrongful 
768 F.2d 1186, 1189 (loth Cir. 1985); Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 
Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 
1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Davis v. City of 
Ellenburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wa. 1987); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. 
Fla. 1983); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 
543 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D. Colo. 1982); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
179 791 F.2d 744, 748 (1986); see also Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(recognizing familial due process interest of adult children in parent's life); Curnow v. 
Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321,325 (9 th Cir. 1991) (parents and children have liberty interest in 
familial relationship with decedent). 
180 Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 216-18 (1990); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 
F.2d 386,391-92 (5th Cir. 1992). 
181 See infra Part III.F.l. 
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death cases. 182 Johnson had notice that he could be sued by a parent for his conduct. 
Irrespective of whether the law was clear regarding the constitutional rights of a parent, 
when a personal representative or heir makes a § 1983 claim for the decedent's death, the 
substantive rights at issue for qualified immunity purposes are those of the decedent. 183 Here, 
any reasonable jail social worker faced with the circumstances confronted by Johnson, who knew 
that a detainee was at risk of suicide, would be on fair notice that a failure to act in order to abate 
that risk violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
2. The trial court confused "reasonableness" under the qualified immunity 
standard with "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment standard. 
The trial court erred when it inappropriately applied the reasonableness standard from 
Fourth Amendment cases to the qualified immunity analysis in this Fourteenth Amendment 
claim. 184 Qualified immunity will shield officials who violate the Constitution under 
circumstances in which a reasonable person would not, under similar conditions and in light of 
existing law, have fair notice that they were violating someone's constitutional rights. 185 
18') 
- Anderson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 15 Idaho 513, 99 P. 91, 93 (1908); Sawyer v. Claar, 115 
Idaho 322, 326 (1988); Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, 237 (2006). 
183 Rhyne, 973 F.2d at 391-92; Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2001); Toguchi 
v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); Lee v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,685-86 
(9th Cir. 2001); Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 371 (9 th Cir. 1998); 
Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998); Ward v. City o/San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283 
(9th Cir. 1992); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991); Smith v. City 0/ 
Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987); Berry v. City o/Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1504-5 
(10th Cir. 1990); Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254 (11 th Cir. 2005); Rentz v. Spokane County, 
438 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (E.D. Wa. 2006). 
184 R. pp. 3498-99. 
185 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,203 (2001). 
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The reasonableness standard for searches under the Fourth Amendment and the 
reasonableness standard under the qualified immunity inquiry are distinctly different. 186 Many 
courts confused the two standards for years until the United States Supreme Court in Saucier v. 
Katz expressly held that they are two different inquiries. 187 The reasonableness inquiry for 
Fourth Amendment purposes is whether a search or seizure was a reasonable invasion of a 
person's privacy.188 The inquiry for qualified immunity purposes is whether a reasonable 
person, in light of existing law and under similar circumstances, would be on notice that they 
were violating the law. 189 While it may be a confusing distinction to make in the context of 
Fourth Amendment cases, such confusion should not arise in cases like this one where the officer 
knows the risk faced by the detainee of self-harm. 190 In light of the long-standing law, no person 
with such knowledge can reasonably claim not to realize the constitutional duty to act. 
The trial court in this case unfortunately applied the reasonableness standard of the 
Fourth Amendment to the qualified immunity analysis in this case, and thereby erred as a matter 
oflaw when it found that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity. 
3. The trial court viewed the facts in the wrong light. 
The trial court erred by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson's claim of 
186 Id. 
187 !d. at 201-07. 
188 !d. 
189 Id. 
190 See Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2006) ("'record permitted a reasonable 
inference that Ferguson knew Short was attempting to commit suicide" foreclosing summary 
judgment). 
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qualified immunity when it resolved conflicting expert testimony, made credibility 
determinations, and accepted Johnson's self-serving testimony at face value. 191 The errors may 
have been due to the reliance on this Court's decision in Nation v. State, where it was said that 
the first question in qualified immunity analysis is whether "taken in the light most favorable to 
the party asserting immunity, did the alleged conduct violate a constitutional rightT I92 This 
Court cited Saucier v. Katz, but Saucier held just the opposite, writing that the first question of 
qualified immunity is whether "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the 
injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional rightT I93 This 
Court should take this opportunity to expressly overrule that portion of the opinion in Nation that 
is inconsistent with the direction given in Saucier to view the facts in a light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party. 
It appears the trial court followed Nation's direction in its qualified immunity analysis. 
While the trial court recognized that there was conflicting expert testimony,194 it went on to 
resolve the conflict in Johnson's favor by discounting the expert testimony of Dr. White, 
Dr. Metzner, and Social Worker PowelL I95 Dr. White's affidavit explained that Johnson's 
conduct fell far below the standard for correctional suicide assessment. 196 Dr. Metzner provided 
191 94 R. pp. 34 -99. 
192 144 Idaho 177, 187 (2007). 
193 Nation, 144 Idaho at 187 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001)). 
194 R. p. 3398. 
195 See R. pp. 3491-99. 
196 R. pp. 2120, 3012-30. 
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a similar affidavit. 197 Social Worker Powell also provided an affidavit testifying that Johnson's 
conduct was an extreme deviation from the standard of care for social workers performing 
suicide assessments. 198 The trial court erred by discounting each of these experts' testimony 
regarding the standards of practice in their respective fields of expertise. 
The trial court also made credibility determinations, though not expressly, by accepting 
Johnson's self-serving testimony and the testimony of the Ada County Defendants' other 
witnesses at face value. The trial court accepted Johnson's testimony at face value regarding the 
thought process that he went through on the morning of September 29,2008, when he spoke with 
Bradley.199 Johnson claimed that he exercised reasonable clinical judgment and was therefore 
entitled to qualified immunity, but that claim is severely undermined by his own testimony and 
the testimony of Wroblewski.2oo Johnson testified first that Bradley was not on suicide watch, 
and then he testified that he was on suicide watch. 20 I Johnson could not have exercised 
reasonable clinical judgment without first determining Bradley's then current status. 
Significant conflicts also exist between Johnson's testimony and the testimony of other 
witnesses. For instance, Johnson claimed that one reason he did not re-assess Bradley after 
197 91 R.p.20 . 
198 R. pp. 2080-90. 
199 R. pp. 3494-99. 
200 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., ~ 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 588-90) (Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24, 
41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3)). 
201 Compare R. p. 2693 with p. 2678 (Johnson Dep., 246:18-20 ("Bradley, who I had met with 
and cleared from suicide watch, ... :') and with 186:20-189:2 (denying knowledge that Bradley 
was on suicide watch when Johnson met with him) and 195:12-197:17 (testimony relating to 
documentation of Johnson taking Bradley off suicide watch). 
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Robertson told him that Bradley had threatened suicide over the phone that morning from the 
J ail, was that he had just seen Bradley.202 However, Johnson' s time1ine is not consistent with the 
testimony of Robertson or Jail records. According to Robertson, she conveyed the information 
to Johnson in very specific terms shortly before 10:37 a.m.203 The record is not disputed that 
Johnson was finished with Bradley just minutes after 8:00 a.m?04 
A conflict exists between Johnson's description of Bradley's demeanor when he spoke to 
Bradley, and the description provided by Wroblewski. Johnson described Bradley as being 
relaxed, calm, comfortable, speaking clearly, pleasant, not angry, respectful, and cooperative.2os 
Wroblewski described Bradley as being in poor physical condition, under the influence of 
alcohol, smelling of alcohol, annoyed, angry, hearing voices in his head, seeing shadow people, 
confused, talking about committing suicide, and behaving in a manner that suggested Bradley 
was at risk of suicide.206 
In audio recordings of the telephone calls Bradley made to Catherine Saucier on the 
morning of September 29, 2008, shortly after Johnson spoke to Bradley, Bradley made 
207 
- R. p. 139. 
203 R. p. 2074 (Overson AfT., '2, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 7-10) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1,24:1-30:19, 
Ex. C (Defs' 2d Supp. Resp. 00127)), 2659-93 (Johnson Dep., 112:18-115:5, 226:14-227:6, 
248: 10-12). 
204 R. pp. 1437 (Overson Aff., Ex. A) (video CD), 2074-75 (Overson Afr., , 2, Ex. A (.pdfpp. 7-
10, 25-51) (Robertson Dep., 19:16-20:1, 24:1-30:19, Ex. C); 2659-60, 2688, 2693 (Johnson 
Dep., 112:18-115:5,226:14-227:6,248:10-12). 
205 R. p. 2666 (Johnson Dep., 137:9-138:16, 179:7-23). 
206 R. p. 2075 (Overson Aff., , 8, Ex. F (.pdf pp. 582-84, 588-90) (Wroblewski Dep., 39:1-24, 
41:11-45:15,59:2-22,60:17-67:3)). 
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statements that contradict Johnson's description of Bradley's demeanor that morning.207 Bradley 
stated that the only drug he wanted was Thorazine (a powerful antipsychotic medication).208 
Most unsettling is that Bradley stated that he thought he should kill himself?09 The telephone 
calls clearly contradict Johnson's description of Bradley's mood and apparent state of mind. 
The biggest reason the trial court should not have accepted Johnson's claim of having 
used reasonable judgment is because Johnson testified that he knew Bradley had made multiple 
attempts at suicide by which Bradley intended, planned, and wanted to hurt himself210 Johnson 
documented Bradley's suicidal intent, and by his own testimony, when Johnson uses the term 
"intent" it means "Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious element. ,,2 I I 
[JOHNSON:] And intent, actually, tends to carry a lot. When I 
use the word "intent;' you actually know that I have a high level of 
concern about that. 
A. So I had a serious-you know, I understood the seriousness of 
it. When you see my word "intent"-because, clearly, often 
people with ideation don't require a higher level of observation in 
the jail. 
Because they say, you "These thoughts are entering my head, they 
bother me, but, you know, I can manage them. I don't intend to 
die. I'm not intending to hurt myself." 
So intent-the fact that I wrote "intent" makes me-it may have 
been even, actually, the wrong word. Maybe I meant he 
attempted? But just the fact irs there makes me know that I was 
very clear that, you know, this guy-it's been serious in the past. 
Q. SO I just want to make sure I understand. Suicidal ideation 
207 R. p. 2074 (Overson Aff,,-r 6, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 389-91) (Investigative Report, pp. 8-9)). 
208 Id. 
209 See Id. 
210 R. pp. 2691-92 (Johnson Dep., 240:14-242:17). 
211Id. 
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may be down here on the risk leveL And then intent, the next 
level. And-
A. Means, available means, method, and those kinds of things 
and-
A. -you know, planned? Means, intent--or means, method, plan, 
and then attempt, yeah, you're starting to arc way up into what you 
consider increased risk. 212 
In explaining what he meant when he used the specific term "intent" in his documentation of his 
September 29, 2008 suicide assessment of Bradley, Johnson testified that he knew Bradley was 
planning and wanting to hurt himself: 
Intent to hurt yourself, you know, I knew that there was a serious 
element. Whether I had that in my idea -- you know, in my idea 
that he had actually also done the things that we know that he had 
done, the overdose and the cutting -- I mean, intent actually -- I 
know that this guy was planning and wanting to hurt 
himself.213 
Given lohnson's testimony and the trial court's findings of fact, it is clear that the trial court did 
not view the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland. 
The trial court was bound under LR.C.P. 56 and Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho 
Constitution to view the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland. The LR.C.P. 56 
requirement that a trial court view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party is an 
important safeguard of the right to trial by jury.214 Here, the trial court denied Ms. Hoagland her 
212 Id. 
213Id. 
214 Schroeder v. Partin, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (2011) ("Only the jury may weigh evidence and 
assess witness credibility"); Thomas v. Medical Ctr. Physicians, 138 Idaho 200, 205 (2002); 
accord Thompson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 62 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that summary 
judgment may interfere with the right to jury trial under state law). 
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right to a jury trial by viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson. Had the trial court 
properly viewed the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Hoagland, it would have had to deny 
Johnson's motion for summary judgment. 
4. Conclusion 
The trial court committed reversible error by finding that as a matter of law a government 
official who knows a detainee is at risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable action to 
address that risk would not be on notice that such actions were in violation of a detainee's 
constitutional rights; by finding that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity based on the 
reasonableness standard used to determine liability in Fourth Amendment cases; and by viewing 
the facts in a light most favorable to Johnson's claim of qualified immunity. Each of these errors 
is an independent basis for reversal, and this Court should reverse and remand for trial. 
D. The Trial Court Erred By Dismissing the Monell Claims Against Ada County 
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to all Ada County Defendants sued 
in their official capacity despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. 215 The affidavits 
of Drs. White216 and Metzner217 created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Jail was 
being operated within constitutional standards and whether unconstitutional customs and 
practices were a moving force in Bradley's death. As set forth in each of their affidavits, there 
were serious systemic problems with the manner in which healthcare was delivered to the 
215 R. pp. 2323-38,3499-3501. 
216 R. pp. 2120-97, 3012-30. 
217 R. pp. 2091-2119. 
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c 
inmates at the Jai1.218 This was not a single instance of unconstitutional practice.219 
The trial court believed that Ms. Hoagland had to prove a "series of bad acts" in order to 
prevail on her official capacity claims.22o However, "a series of bad acts" is not the standard for 
establishing municipal liability under § 1983. The standard is that a plaintiff must show 
deliberate indifference on an institutional scale, which Ms. Hoagland did with proof of repeated 
examples of medical care denials and delays that bespeak a deliberate indifference: 
While a single instance of medical care denied or delayed, viewed 
in isolation, may appear to be the product of mere negligence, 
repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate 
indifference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by 
haphazard and ill-conceived procedures. Indeed, it is well-settled 
in this circuit that "a series of incidents closely related in time ... 
may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate 
indifference to the medical needs of prisoners. ,,22 1 
The trial court should have denied the Ada County Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment because Ms. Hoagland showed by the affidavits of her experts that a genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to whether the Jail had systemically failed to meet the healthcare needs of 
its inmates and whether that failure was a moving force in Bradley's death. This Court should 
reverse and remand. 
218 R. pp. 2091-2197,3012-30. 
219 Id. 
220 R. pp. 2323-38, 3499-3501. 
221 Krause v. Whitely, 985 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1993) (Table) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 
559, 575 (10th Cir.) (deliberate indifference may be shown by repeated examples of negligent 
acts which disclose a pattern of conduct by the prison medical staff), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 
(1981)). 
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E. The Trial Court Erred By Dismissing Ms. Hoagland's Claims Against Kate Pape 
The trial court erred by dismissing Kate Pape in her individual capacity under the wrong 
legal standard. Ms. Hoagland's claim against Pape was that her failure to supervise, train and 
enforce the written policies of the Jail's medical unit caused Bradley's death. The trial court 
failed to understand that the supervisory claim against Pape did not require a showing of actual 
knowledge.222 A claim against a supervisor in an individual capacity can proceed on proof that 
the supervisor "knew or should have known" that there was a high degree of risk that a 
subordinate would violate someone's rights but "either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that 
risk by failing to take action that a reasonable supervisor would find necessary to prevent such a 
risk, and that failure caused a constitutional injury.,,223 
Pape knew or should have known that her employees were not fulfilling their 
constitutional duties toward inmates to provide adequate medical care. As Dr. White observed: 
It seems clear that ACJ administrators did not meet their 
obligations to provide necessary supervision or oversight required 
to ensure adequate levels of performance or policy compliance. 
The deficiencies exemplified in Mr. Munroe's case suggest critical 
lack of reasonable quality control measures which was confirmed 
by the withdrawal ofNCCHC accreditation, suggesting a pervasive 
and repetitive pattern of indifference to policy compliance at ACJ. 
In my judgment, Mr. Munroe's death was the direct result of the 
cumulative effects of a cascading series of inadequate assessments 
and treatment for his mental health needs.224 
222 R. p. 3502; for additional factual support, see R. pp. 3231-49 and record citations therein. 
223 Poe, 282 F.3d at 142; see also Provost v. City a/Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2nd Cir. 2001) 
(stating that there can be no liability for gross negligence absent evidence that a supervisor 
"knew or should have known" about an illegality). 
724 
- R. p. 2135. 
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Pape had actual knowledge of the widespread problems within the Jail medical unit by 
the NCCHC revoking the Jail's certification before Bradley's death.225 Pape admitted running 
the medical unit in an ad hoc manner irrespective of the written policies.226 There were many 
instances where employees of the medical unit did not know the policies of the Jail-Johnson 
being one, since he was allowed to work as a social worker in an Idaho jail without a social work 
license, and did not bother to familiarize himself with the operations of the Jai1.227 
For these reasons, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to Pape. 
F. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law By Dismissing Count I On The 
Grounds That Bradley's § 1983 Cause Of Action Abated Upon His Death 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling that Ms. Hoagland cannot pursue a 
§ 1983 action for the violation of Bradley's constitutional rightS.228 In reaching its decision, the 
trial court applied the analysis used by this Court in Evans v. Twin Falls County,229 and by the 
United States Supreme Court in Robertson v. Wegmann,230 to determine whether Ms. Hoagland 
had a claim for the violation of Bradley's constitutional rightS.23l In Evans, this Court held that 
where a decedent's death was not caused by the constitutional violation, a decedent's § 1983 
claims abate upon the plaintiffs death.232 Under Robertson, the United States Supreme Court 
225 R. pp. 2091-2119, 2120-97, 2991-3011, 3012-30. 
226 R. pp. 3104-05, 3112-14 (Pape Dep., 188:5-189:23,217:25-218:25; 223:14-225:l3). 
227 R. pp. 2645-46, 2688-89 (Johnson Dep., 58:12-59:23, 227:14-229:15). 
228 R. pp. 1541-1588, 2317-2322; for additional support in case development see R. pp. 1799-
1805. 
229 118 Idaho 210, 216-18 (1990), 
230 436 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978), 
23l R. pp. 1541-88,2317-22. 
232 118 Idaho at 218. 
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held that where the decedent's death was not caused by the constitutional violations and the 
personal representative of the decedent's estate did not have standing under Louisiana state law, 
the decedent's § 1983 claim abated?33 
1. Idaho's Probate Code provides Ms. Hoagland with standing to pursue a 
survivorship and a wrongful death claim under § 1983. 
The trial court erred by failing to recognize that Idaho's Probate Code gIVes 
Ms. Hoagland standing to bring a survivorship and a wrongful death claim. Ms. Hoagland 
brought Count I of the Third Amertded Complaint as an heir and as the personal representative of 
Bradley's estate which gave her standing to bring a survivorship claim pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-
311(2), 5-327, and 15-1-201(22). Ms. Hoagland brought Count II of the Third Amended 
Complaint in her individual capacity, but her standing to bring a wrongful death claim is 
premised on her status as an heir and personal representative under I.C. § 5-311 and 15-1-
201(22).234 The trial court dismissed Ms. Hoagland's survivorship claim on the grounds that 
under the analysis in Evans and Robertson, all of Bradley's § 1983 claims abated upon his death 
irrespective of whether the constitutional violation caused his death.235 
Under the Evans/Robertson analysis, if federal law does not provide for a necessary 
substantive rule of law to be applied in a § 1983 action, the court is to determine whether state 
law can provide an appropriate rule.236 If state law is not inconsistent with the deterrent and 
233 436 U.S. at 594-95. 
234 See R. pp. 1522-38. 
235 See R. pp. 1578-87. 
236 Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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compensatory purposes for which § 1983 was enacted, the court is to apply the state 1aw.237 If 
the state law is inconsistent with the policies of § 1983, the court may then fashion a rule that 
satisfies those policies.238 The trial court in this case erred in its application of the Evans/ 
Robertson analysis which has consistently been used to determine who can sue under § 1983 
when the person whose rights were violated has died before judgment was entered or was killed 
by the constitutional violation in question.239 
The trial court erred in this case because in cases where the defendant's wrongful conduct 
causes death, § 1983' s policy purposes are not sufficiently advanced if the claim abates. The 
trial court mistakenly applied the common law abatement rule that applies only to cases where 
death is caused by something other than the defendant's conduct, such as in Evans and 
Robertson.24o The claim abated in Evans because there was no evidence that the defendant's 
actions caused the plaintiff's death.24I The claim in Robertson abated because the state statute 
did not identify personal representatives as having standing to pursue the claim when the plaintiff 
died of unrelated causes.242 Had the person substituting for the deceased plaintiff in Robertson 
been a "spouse, children, parents, or siblings" instead of a personal representative, the claim 
could have been pursued because under the applicable state law .. the action survives only in 
237 Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90. 
238 Evans, 118 Idaho at 216-18; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90. 
239 See cases cited infra note 246. 
740 
- See Evans, 118 Idaho at 215 n. 5; Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592. 
241 Id. 
242 436 U.S. at 594. 
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favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings.,,243 The Robertson case arose in Louisiana 
which "does not allow the deceased's personal representative to be substituted as plaintifCo244 
Idaho law does.245 
2. A § 1983 claim does not abate where the wrong caused death. 
Even if Idaho's statute did not provide for a survivorship claim, Count I of the Third 
Amended Complaint still should not have been dismissed. The trial court erred by applying the 
abatement rule without sufficient consideration for the fact that this case involved a death caused 
by the violation of the decedent's constitutional rights. To fully effectuate the purpose of § 1983 
(i. e., deterrence and compensation), the abatement rule cannot apply to cases where the 
constitutional wrong caused a death. Numerous federal courts have so held.246 
A rule that abates all claims upon death has no place in the § 1983 context when the 
cause of death is a constitutional wrong. The deterrence policies of § 1983 would be severely 
243 !d. at 591. 
244 Id. 
245 See I.C. §§ 5-311(2),5-327, and 15-1-201(22). 
246 See Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1189-90 (ih Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 
746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 (7th Cir. 1984); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984); Brazier v. 
Cherry, 293 F.2d 402, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. Oakland, 915 F. 
Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Davis v. City 
of Ellenburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wa. 1987); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 
(S.D. Fla. 1983); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Sager v. City of Woodland 
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D. Colo. 1982); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 (N.D. Ill. 
1982); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (in federal Bivens claim survived 
death); Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 
1994) (wrongful death claims brought under international human rights laws survived death). 
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undermined by application of such a rule where, as here, the serious harm likely to result from an 
official's deliberate indifference is death. This is true of the entire class of constitutional claims 
where a death results. Application of an abatement rule to the entire class of cases would serve 
to have the opposite impact on official misconduct than § 1983 was intended to have. Instead of 
deterrence, abatement of the claim would serve to create an incentive to ensure the direst 
consequences of official misconduct. The purpose of § 1983 would be seriously undermined if 
only those who survived illegally inflicted pain and suffering were able to enforce those rights. 
3. Conclusion. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by dismissing Count I because survivorship claims 
do not abate in Idaho. However, should this Court hold that Idaho does not provide for a 
survivorship claim, this Court should reject application of the abatement rule to § 1983 claims 
where the wrong resulted in death. For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse and remand. 
G. The Trial Court Erred By Awarding $15,815.31 In Costs As A Matter Of Right 
And $77,438.12 In Discretionary Costs 
The trial court erred by awarding costs as a matter of right that are not allowed under 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C), and by relieving the Ada County Defendants of their burden of proof when 
awarding $77,438.12 in discretionary costs and not making express findings as to why each 
specific item was a necessary and exceptional cost reasonably incurred and should, in the interest 
of justice, be awarded. The award of $93,253.43 was excessive, unsupported, and unjust. By 
making such an award, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law. This 
Court should therefore reverse and vacate the judgment awarding costs. 
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1. The trial court erred in awarding costs as a matter of right that are 
not allowed under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C). 
A trial court errs if it awards nondiscretionary costs that are not expressly allowed by 
Rule 54(d)(1)(C).247 "In awarding non-discretionary costs the trial court must follow the 
guidelines in LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C).,,248 "The question ofa trial court's compliance with the rules 
of civil procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an 
11 . fr . ,,249 appe ate court exercIses ee reVIew. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in its award of non-discretionary costs under 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) in the amount of $182.81 for "Attempted Service", $415.00 for "Reporting 
& Transcribing" depositions that were canceled, and $500.00 for transcription fees as "exhibit 
preparation" for a transcript that was never used in a hearing or tria1.250 These are not costs that 
can be awarded under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) as non-discretionary costS.251 Rule 54(d)(1)(C)(2) only 
allows for "[a]ctual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by 
a public officer or other person. ·,252 Attempted service is not a cost that can be awarded as a 
matter of right under Rule 54( d) (1 )(C)(2). Similarly, "[ c ]harges for reporting and transcribing of 
a deposition taken" may be awarded under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(c)(9); costs for canceled depositions 
247 George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 391 (App. 1988). 
248 !d. 
249 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257 (1997). 
250 Supp. R. pp. 51-52 ("2,6,9),61, 138; Tr. (9/15/11),24: 10-23. 
251 George W Watkins Family, 115 Idaho 386, 391 (App. 1988) (trial court cannot award non-
discretionary costs that are not expressly enumerated under Rule 54(d)(1)(C)). 
252 !d. 
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cannot.253 Finally, costs for preparation of exhibits are only allowed as a matter of right if the 
exhibit was ·'admitted in evidence ... in a hearing or trial of an action.,,254 
2. The trial court erred by awarding discretionary costs where the trial court 
relieved the Defendants of their burden of proof and did not make the required 
express findings necessary to support such an award. 
The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by awarding 
discretionary costs under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) without first requiring the Ada County Defendants 
to prove why the specific items of discretionary costs should be allowed, and further by not 
making express findings that the costs were necessary, exceptional, reasonably incurred, and 
should be awarded in the interest of justice.255 The court may award a prevailing party 
discretionary costs only where there is an adequate "showing that the costs are necessary and 
exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party. ,,256 
3. The trial court erred by relieving the Defendants of their initial burden. 
The party requesting discretionary costs has the initial burden of showing the costs were 
necessary, exceptional, and reasonable and should in the interest of justice be awarded.257 A 
party failing to show why the costs are necessary, exceptional and reasonably incurred is not 
253 LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C)(9) (emphasis added). 
254 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)(6) (emphasis added); George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 
Idaho 386, 391 (Ct. App. 1988) (trial court erred by awarding non-discretionary costs of exhibits 
not admitted as evidence). 
255 See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132,138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24:10-31:20. 
256 LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(D) (emphasis added). 
257 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314-315 
(2005); Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880-881 (1993). 
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entitled to discretionary costS.258 "The party must also show that the costs should be assessed 
against the adverse party 'in the interest of justice .. ,.259 
Exceptional costs "include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself 
exceptional.,,260 Routine litigation costs are not exceptiona1.261 Even fees for experts who were 
. 1 h b d' 267 mstrumenta to t e case may e or mary costs. -
The Ada County Defendants did not meet their burden of proof for an award of 
discretionary costs, and the trial court did not make the necessary express findings. The 
Defendants' initial filing lacked any argument as to why the case was exceptional, why the costs 
were incurred because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case, or why the costs were 
necessary and reasonably incurred.263 Nor did the Defendants attempt to prove that the requested 
award would be in the interest ofjustice.264 After Ms. Hoagland moved to disallow discretionary 
00 
costs on the grounds that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof, the Defendants 
258 Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881; Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314-315. 
259 Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881; Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314-315; see also, Swallow v. 
Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 598 (2003) (reversed award of discretionary costs 
because the trial court did not make a finding that the award was in the interest of justice). 
260 Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314; see also, lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384 (1999) (trial 
court's denial of discretionary costs upheld where costs were found to be reasonable and 
necessary but not exceptional). 
261 See, e.g., Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-494 (1998) (denial of expert fees was not an 
abuse of discretion where the fees were the type of fees routinely required by the type of case at 
issue); Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314 ("Certain cases, such as personal injury cases, generally 
involve copy, travel and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather 
than 'exceptional' under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)"). 767 ~ - Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432 (App. 2001). 
263 Supp. R. pp. 23-41,44-56. 
264 1d. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 60 
attempted to provide support for their claim of discretionary costs with an unsubstantiated, 
conclusory argument.265 Even with their late filing, the Defendants still failed to meet their 
burden, and thereby left the trial court without grounds to award discretionary costs. 
4. The Defendants did not meet their burden of proving that this case was 
exceptional. 
Ada County Defendants argued that this case was exceptional because it was a § 1983 
action brought in state court, and because the case involved "unique factual scenarios and legal 
arguments which typically do not appear in a standard tort claim.,o266 That a § 1983 case is 
brought in state court is no basis for finding that the case is exceptional because a § 1983 
plaintiff has a right under federal law to bring the case in state or federal court.267 Neither is the 
fact that a § 1983 claim is not a state tort claim any reason for finding the case to be exceptional. 
This was a constitutional tort case for personal injury with many similarities to a standard state 
tort claim for personal injuries. The difference between a standard state tort claim and a § 1983 
claim for personal injury is the source and nature of the duty breached by the defendant.268 
The Defendants did not show why this case was exceptional. The trial court erred by 
relieving the Defendants of their burden of proof while still awarding their requested 
discretionary costs. Doing so was a misapplication of LR.C.P. 54( d)(1 )(D) and therefore was an 
265 Supp. R. pp. 57-89,98-132. 
266 Supp. R. p. 73; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24: 1 0-31 :20. 
267 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (U.S. 1990). 
268 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (section 1983 "was intended to create "a species of 
tort liability' in favor of persons deprived of federally secured rights") (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,417 (1976)). 
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error of law as well as an abuse of discretion. 
5. The Defendants did not meet their burden of proving the costs were incurred 
because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case. 
Even assuming that the Ada County Defendants met the threshold showing that this case 
was exceptional, they failed to meet the threshold showing that specific costs were incurred 
because of the alleged exceptional nature of the case.269 That this case was in state court does 
not make all costs exceptional. The costs of a § 1983 case would be the same in state or federal 
court. While the Defendants claimed the case involved unique legal arguments and procedures, 
they did not prove the costs were incurred because of the alleged exceptional nature of the 
case.270 The costs claimed and awarded were largely for factual development-not for legal 
research, briefing, or other matters relating to legal arguments and procedure. The novel 
questions of law that arose in the case had little to no bearing on the claimed discretionary costs. 
For instance, the trial court awarded $12,140.53 in travel expenses without evidence 
showing why the costs were incurred as a result of the allegedly exceptional nature of the case, 
or why the costs were necessary or reasonably incurred.271 The travel expenses awarded 
included a trip to San Francisco for three attorneys, one of whom was Mr. Mallet, who is the 
Sheriffs chief legal counsel and not counsel of record. 272 There was no showing as to the 
necessity and reasonableness of Mr. Mallet's expenses or for the necessity and reasonableness of 
269 See Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314. 
270 See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132,138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 8:8-10:20, 24:10-31:20. 
271 Id. 
272 See R. pp.2477-78 (deposition transcript showing Sheriffs chief legal advisor, J. Mallet 
present for the deposition of Johnson in San Francisco); Supp. R. pp. 53, 140. 
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three attorneys for one deposition in San Francisco.273 Travel costs awarded included 
investigative expenses for travel to Sacramento and Portland, but there was no showing why the 
investigator's expenses were necessary or reasonable?74 
The trial court also awarded $509.36 in postage, notary charges, and Federal Express 
charges without any support or argument that the costs were exceptional, necessary, reasonable, 
and awardable in the interest of justice. 275 The trial court awarded $1,181.52 for "AES Temp 
Employee" without any support for that charge.276 There was no explanation as to what the 
charge was for, who it was paid to, or why it was exceptional, necessary, reasonable and just that 
Ms. Hoagland pay those charges.277 
Fees of $63,060.83 were awarded for six defense experts.278 Another $1,700.00 was 
awarded as fees paid to Ms. Hoagland's experts without explanation or support.279 None of the 
experts testified in a deposition or hearing, and much of what was offered by the experts was 
cumulative?80 
Copy costs of $303.00 were awarded without explanation of how the records related to 
the litigation and why they were exceptional, necessary, and reasonable and should justly be 
273 See Supp. R. pp. 23-89, 98-132, 138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 5:4-35:22. 




278 Supp. R. pp. 138-40. 
279 Id. 
280 See Supp. R. pp.23-89, 98-132, 138-41; Tr. (9/15/11), 5:4-35:22; HoaglandCONF .pdf, 
pp. 145-278 (Defense Expert Affidavits). 
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awarded.281 Another $490.00 was awarded for transcription fees of Jail calls without any basis 
to believe the transcripts were ever filed with the trial court.282 No argument was made as to 
why these costs were necessary or reasonable, or why the interest of justice would be served by 
making such an award.283 Finally, $233.75 was awarded for an investigator without explanation 
as to why such an expense was exceptional, necessary, and reasonable and justified as an 
award.284 
No attempt was made by the Defendants to explain why it was necessary to incur such 
excessive costs, why the costs were incurred due to the allegedly exceptional nature of the case, 
why their costs were reasonable, and why, in the interest of justice, Ms. Hoagland should pay 
these expenses?85 The trial court erred as a matter of law by relieving the Defendants of their 
burden of proof. With free review over a trial court's compliance with Rule 54 when awarding 
discretionary costs, this Court should reverse the discretionary costs award.286 
6. The trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by awarding 
discretionary costs without making express findings. 
The trial court failed to make all of the express findings required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) 
for awarding discretionary costs. Specifically, the trial court never explained how the costs were 
necessary and reasonably incurred, and never tied its conclusions to the actual costs it 
281 Id. 




286 JR. Simpiot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 257 (1997). 
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awarded.287 The failure to comply with LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) was an abuse of discretion and an 
error of law. In ruling on objections to requested costs, a trial court "shall make express 
findings as to why such specific items of discretionary cost should or should not be 
allowed.,,288 A trial court abuses its discretion if it does not make "express findings as required 
by LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) with regard to the general character of the requested costS.,,289 
Here, the trial court adopted Ada County's unsubstantiated arguments and concluded that 
the case was exceptional.29o Then, the trial court summarily concluded that the costs were also 
necessary and reasonably incurred without explaining the basis for those two separate 
conclusions.291 
Therefore, because of the nature of the claims in this case and the 
complexity of the work Defendants undertook to defend against 
those claims, Defendants [ sic] request for discretionary costs for 
deposition travel costs, expert fees, copies of records, and 
investigator fees were exceptional, necessary, and reasonably 
incurred.292 
In doing so, the trial court referenced each category of costs but never discussed any of the actual 
costs involved?93 Merely identifying a category of costs such as "deposition travel costs" and 
287 See Supp. R. pp. 138-41. 
288 LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added); see Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 
420, 425 (1999) (reversed award where there was no express finding of exceptional, necessary, 
reasonable and in the interest of justice); Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314 (trial court must make 
"express findings as to the general character of the requested costs and whether such costs are 
necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice"). 
289 Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 474 (2001). 
290 Supp. R. pp. 138-40. 
291 Supp. R. p. 140. 
292 [d. 
293 8 Supp. R. pp. 13 -41. 
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concluding it is a necessary and reasonable cost is not the same as making an express finding as 
to the general character of the requested costs. While an item-by-item finding may not be 
required, an "express finding as to the general character of the requested cost" requires more than 
merely lumping generic categories together and saying they were exceptional, necessary and 
reasonable. Here, the trial court never tied Ada County's arguments to the actual costs 
awarded.294 For the reasons already stated, the trial court's reasoning does not support its 
conclusion that this case was exceptional. The trial court provided no reason for its conclusion 
that the requested costs were necessary and reasonably incurred. And none of the trial court's 
conclusions stand up when compared to the actual costs that were awarded. There is such a 
disconnect between the trial court's conclusions and the actual costs awarded that the trial court's 
findings cannot satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). As such, the award of 
discretionary costs must be reversed. 
7. The trial court erred as a matter oflaw by failing to apply the '''in the interest of 
justice" element of I.R.C.P. S4(d)(I)(D) correctly. 
The trial court based its decision to award discretionary costs under the interest of justice 
element by finding that "it is not unjust to award discretionary costs here:,295 That is not the 
standard under by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The trial court correctly recognized that a prerequisite to 
awarding discretionary costs was "whether it is in the interest of justice to assess discretionary 
costs against Plaintiff.,,296 The trial court, however, never made that finding. Instead, the trial 
294 See Supp. R. pp. 138-41. 
295 Supp. R. p. 140. 
296 !d. 
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court inverted LR.C.P. 54(d)(I)(D)'s '·in the interest of justice" requirement and put the burden 
of proof on Ms. Hoagland to show it would be unjust to award the costs against her: 
The remaining consideration for the Court is whether it is in the 
interest of justice to assess discretionary costs against Plaintiff. 
This is a discretionary decision for the Court. Reasonable minds 
may differ as to whether it is in the interest of justice to award 
discretionary costs to Defendants. The natural inclination in a case 
such as this is to feel sympathy for a parent whose child died 
young and tragically. However, it is not unjust to award 
discretionary costs here. The Court finds it is in the interest of 
justice to award discretionary costs to Defendants.297 
The trial court failed to articulate why it was in the interest of justice to make such an award. 
Declaring that an award of costs would not be unjust is not adequate support for the affirmative 
finding that such an award was being made in the interest of justice. 298 
It is clear from the trial court's comments during the hearing that it believed that 
Ms. Hoagland had the burden of showing that it would be unjust to award discretionary costs 
. h )99 agamst er.-
You know, do I really have enough, though, in the record other 
than just my supposition based on those phone calls which were 
submitted for a different purpose, to conclude as a matter of fact 
that she is poor?300 
The trial court requested additional briefing on the issue, and both parties submitted briefs with 
supporting affidavits.301 While the Ada County Defendants were unable to cite to a single case 
297 Supp. R. p. 140. 
298 See Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598 (reversed discretionary costs award because the trial court did 
not make a finding that the award was in the interest of justice). 
299 Tr. (9/15111), 8:16-9:11, 20:11-14, 25:4-31:20, 32:5-35:2. 
300 Tr. (9115111), 30:12-16. 
301 Tr. (9115111), 51:22-52:6, 32:5-35:2; Supp. R. pp. 98-132. 
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addressing whether ability to pay was a consideration under the justice prong of Rule 54, 
Ms. Hoagland cited the trial court to multiple cases holding that ability to pay should be 
considered, along with secondary sources supporting the same conclusion.302 Ms. Hoagland 
submitted an affidavit showing her limited ability to pay.303 Nevertheless, the trial court made 
no conclusions oflaw or finding of fact on the subject. 304 
The trial court gave Ada County every opportunity to provide it with some basis for 
finding that it was in the interest of justice to award discretionary costs against Ms. Hoagland, 
and yet, no basis was provided. The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider 
Ms. Hoagland's ability to pay, failing to make a finding as to whether she should pay in the 
interest of justice, and in placing the burden of proof on her to rebut the Ada County Defendants' 
claim for discretionary costs. For that reason, this Court should reverse the judgment of costs. 
8. The trial court erred by not properly considering Ms. Hoagland's financial 
status and the devastating impact of the cost award. 
A trial court must make specific findings as to whether it is in the interest of justice to 
assess discretionary costs against an adverse party, and failure to do so is reversible error.305 The 
ability to pay is an equitable factor to be considered by a trial court under the "in the interest of 
justice" prong of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). In this case, the trial court failed to make specific 
302 S R upp. . pp. 118-32. 
303 S upp. R. pp. 114-17. 
304 Supp. R. p. 140. 
305 Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598; Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. etr., 134 Idaho 46, 60 (Idaho 
2000); see also Richard J and Esther E. Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho 180, 188 (1999) (party 
requesting discretionary costs "must also show that the costs should be assessed against the 
adverse party 'in the interest of justice' "). 
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findings as to the financial status of Ms. Hoagland.306 
Although this Court has never decided the issue of whether "ability to pay" should be 
considered as part of the "in the interest of justice" inquiry, the federal courts have held that it is 
reversible error not to include that equitable consideration before awarding fees and costS.307 
All of the federal cases cited supra footnote 307 dealt with costs "as a matter of course" 
and not with discretionary cost awards. The presumption that normally exists for costs "as a 
matter of right" does not apply to discretionary cost awards because the burden is on the 
requesting party to prove it should be awarded discretionary costS.308 A party does not have to 
306 Supp. R. pp. 20-22, 66, 73-78, 81-88, 98-144; Tr. (9115111), 8:8-20,28:22-31 :20. 
307 See Toliver v. County of Sullivan, 957 F.2d 47, 49-50 (2nd Cir. 1992) (court must consider 
ability to pay in awarding fees); Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028-29 (2nd Cir. 
1979) (ability to pay is part of equitable consideration in fee award decision); Weaver v. Toombs, 
948 F.2d 1004,1013 (6th Cir. 1991) (indigence may be a consideration in awarding or denying 
costs); Haynie v. Ross Gear Division of TRW, Inc., 799 F.2d 237 (6th Cir.), vacated as moot, 482 
U.S. 901 (1987) (required examination of plaintiffs ability to afford costs before an assessment 
is made); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir. 1983) ("This Court 
has recently stated that the inability to pay is a proper factor to be considered in granting or 
denying taxable costs"); Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("We conclude that the district court abused its discretion, particularly based on the district 
court's failure to consider two factors: Stanley's indigency, and the chilling effect of imposing 
such high costs on future civil rights litigants"); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 
917 (11 th Cir. 1982) (consideration in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case 
is ability of plaintiff to pay fees); Baez v. United States Dept. of Justice, 684 F.2d 999, 1004 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (survey of federal circuits on whether ability to pay is a factor in awarding 
costs); Robinson v. City ofN Olmstead, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17668 (N.D. Ohio May 7,1997) 
(denying costs in § 1983 case where plaintiff could not afford to pay); see also Liability of 
Allegedly Indigent Litigant for Costs Under FR.C.P. 54(d)(l), 25 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 471 (2008); 
Financial considerations as affecting court's discretion, 21A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 50: 1213. 
308 Auto. Club, 124 Idaho at 880-881. 
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be indigent to avoid discretionary costs being assessed. 309 The question is not whether a party is 
indigent so much as whether an award of costs might make them indigent.3lo 
In Legros v. Jewell, the Superior Court of Delaware declined to award costs under 54( d) 
against a non-prevailing plaintiff because the plaintiff was of modest means working at a chicken 
factory. 3 1 1 
Rule 54( d) provides that costs will be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party "unless the Court otherwise directs." There is no 
doubt that an assessment of costs against the plaintiffs in this case 
would be a severe financial hardship, and in all probability would 
simply become an uncollectible assessment serving no real 
purpose. Even if the plaintiffs, despite hardship, could afford to 
pay the costs, I do not believe it would be appropriate to burden 
these unsuccessful plaintiffs with these costS. 312 
In Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel., it was held that the "most important equitable factor is 
indigency or inability to pay. ,,313 
In this case, Ms. Hoagland works as a cook at a restaurant in Melba, Idaho, making $8.00 
per hour working six-and-a-halfhour shifts three days per week. 3 14 She started working there in 
309 Cherry v. Champion International Corporation, 186 F.3d 442, 446 (1999) (a party "of such 
modest means that it would be unjust or inequitable to enforce Rule 54( d)(1 Y' should not be 
taxed costs). 
310 Stanley v. University ofS. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Thompson v. 
Vista View, LLC, 2009 WL 3334192 (S.D. Va.) (requiring a party to pay half of their annual 
salary to cover costs is unjust); Rivera v. NIB CO, 701 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (E.D. Ca. 2010) (it is 
an abuse of discretion not to consider the plaintiff s limited financial resources when determining 
whether to deny costs). 
311 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 194 (2001) (unpublished). 
312 Id; see also Nelson v. Feldman, 2011 WL 531946 (Del. Super. 2011) (unpublished) 
(appropriate to consider ability to pay discretionary costs). 
313 143 P.3d 1205, 1224 (2006). 
314 Supp. R. pp. 114-17. 
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January 2011 and was unemployed prior to that.315 She has no significant earnings history.316 
She has no significant assets to speak of.317 The home in which she resides is valued at 
approximately $177,520, and has a mortgage of approximately $55,000.00 with monthly 
payments of $303.00.318 Mr. Hoagland earns $14.00 per hour as a truck driver and works 40 
hours per week. 319 Other than their home, they have no significant assets. 
A non-prevailing party's ability to pay discretionary costs is an equitable consideration 
under LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) and the trial court erred as a matter oflaw when it failed to make that 
consideration. 
9. Conclusion. 
In awarding the Ada County Defendants $93,253.43 in costs, the trial court committed 
numerous errors oflaw and abused its discretion under LR.C.P. 54. It awarded costs that are not 
allowed under the law. It relieved the Ada County Defendants of their burden of proof. It failed 
to make the required express findings. It failed to correctly apply the "in the interest of justice" 
prong of LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). The award of $93,253.43 is excessive, unsupported, and unjust. 
By making such an award, the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law. This 
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H. Request For Attorney Fees 
In the event that she is the prevailing party, Ms. Hoagland should be awarded attorney 
fees and costs on her appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-107 and 12-121 and Idaho Appellate 
Rules 40 and 41. The § 1983 claims brought by Ms. Hoagland expressly allow for recovery of 
costs and fees to a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff. 320 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to Wroblewski, Johnson, Ada County, and Pape, and remand for trial. Genuine issues 
of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment and it was reversible error for the trial 
court to grant these parties judgment. For the same reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's cost award, and award Ms. Hoagland fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of February, 2012. 
JONES & SWARTZ~P=LL=--_ 
DAR ' . OVERSON 
ERIC B. SWARTZ 
JoyM. BINGHAM 
320 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252,132 Idaho 385, 387 (1999) 
("A party who prevails on a civil rights claim under § 1983 is entitled to seek recovery of 
attorney fees under § 1988:') (citations omitted); McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 
1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (""Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court may award the prevailing party in a 
§ 1983 claim 'a reasonable attorney's fee as part ofthe costs.''') 
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